Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO by Shaffer, Gregory & Trachtman, Joel
  
Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law 
Antigua Universidad s/n - Apdo.28 20560 Oñati - Gipuzkoa – Spain 
Tel. (+34) 943 783064 / Fax.(+34) 943 783147 
E: opo@iisj.es W: http://opo.iisj.net 
1 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) – Socio-Legal Aspects of Adjudication of 
International Economic Disputes 
ISSN: 2079-5971 
Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO 
GREGORY SHAFFER 
JOEL TRACHTMAN ∗ 
Abstract 
This article develops the framework of comparative institutional analysis for 
assessing the implications of judicial interpretation in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The analytical framework offers an improved means to describe and assess 
the consequences of choices made in treaty drafting and interpretation in terms of 
social welfare and participation in social decision-making. The analysis builds on 
specific examples from WTO case law. Our framework approaches treaty drafting 
and judicial interpretive choices through a comparative institutional lens — that is, 
in comparison with the implications of alternative drafting and interpretive choices 
for social welfare and participation in social decision-making processes. By deciding 
among alternative interpretations, the judicial bodies of the WTO effectively 
determine which social decision-making process decides a particular policy issue. 
That decision, in turn, can have profound domestic and international implications. 
While this article focuses on the WTO, the framework developed here has general 
relevance for understanding the interpretation of international and domestic legal 
texts from “law and economics” and “law and society” perspectives. 
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“[A] choice there has been.” 
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process1 
 
“Human relations are too numerous, too complex, and too dynamic to be 
susceptible to sufficient regulation by means of several verbal formulae, issued at a 
fixed time and with regard to a situation, impossible to grasp with a single 
glance....” 
François Gény, Method of Interpretation and Sources of Private Positive Law2 
1. Introduction 
This article develops a new framework for understanding the drafting and 
interpretation of World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements — that of 
comparative institutional analysis. Our aim is to provide a framework that offers a 
better means for describing and assessing the consequences of choices in treaty 
drafting and interpretation. We draw on specific examples from WTO case law to 
make our case. Both treaty drafting and judicial interpretation implicate a range of 
interacting social decision-making processes, including domestic, regional, 
international, political, administrative, judicial, and market processes, that we 
collectively refer to as institutions. Our definition of institutions has a different focus 
from those definitions conventionally used in institutional economics, which views 
institutions as constraints on future decision-making that are established to 
increase welfare.3 Our framework focuses attention on the ways in which 
institutions determine social decision-making processes, thereby affecting 
participation and welfare. While this Article focuses on the WTO, the framework 
developed here has general relevance for understanding the interpretation of 
international and domestic legal texts from “law and economics” and “law and 
society” perspectives.4 
Choices over alternatives in treaty drafting and subsequent judicial interpretation 
can both be viewed in terms of institutional choices — that is, in terms of their 
implications for different social decision-making processes. These drafting and 
interpretive choices affect the articulation and institutional mediation of individual 
preferences. By affecting which institution decides a policy issue, these choices 
ultimately affect social welfare. Our framework shows how these choices can be 
viewed through a comparative institutional lens — that is, in comparison to the 
implications of alternative drafting and interpretive choices for different institutions.  
In the case of the WTO, drafting and interpretive choices implicate the interaction 
of institutions for domestic, regional, and global governance. WTO judicial 
interpretive choice is constrained by treaty design, text, and prescribed interpretive 
approaches. We thus first address important design choices faced by treaty drafters 
from the perspective of comparative institutional choice, including the interpretive 
methodologies that WTO texts formally prescribe and to which panel and Appellate 
Body decisions refer. 
                                                 
1 Cardozo, 1921, 11. 
2 Gény, 1954, 404 (“Les rapports humains sont trop nombreux, trop complexes, trop changeants, pour 
trouver un règlement suffisant, en quelques formules verbales, édictées à un moment fixe et en 
présence d’une situation impossible à embrasser d’un seul coup d’œil . . . .”). 
3 Cf. Greif, 2006, 30 (defining an institution as “a system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations”); 
North, 1990, 3 (defining institutions as “rules of the game”); Williamson, 1985, 1 (noting that “the 
transaction cost approach maintains that these institutions have the main purpose and effect of 
economizing on transaction costs”). 
4 In particular, this Article builds on the important work of Neil Komesar, who has applied comparative 
institutional analysis to the interpretation of U.S. public and private law. See Komesar, 1996; Komesar, 
2001. See also Vermeule 2006; Elhauge, 1991. For earlier applications of comparative institutional 
choice in WTO law, see, e.g., Shaffer, 2008, 1; Trachtman, 1997. 
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We then explain why these formal design and methodological choices are radically 
insufficient for understanding WTO law. Like any dispute settlement body 
confronting a legal text, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have choices in 
applying the text to particular factual scenarios that are not specifically addressed 
by the text. More than one WTO provision or WTO agreement may apply to a 
factual situation, whether the provisions are drafted as fairly precise rules, more 
open-ended standards, or exceptions. Interpretive claims are made before panels, 
and the resolution of these interpretive arguments has important consequences not 
only regarding who wins or loses a particular case, but also regarding broader 
systemic issues of domestic and international policy. 
These consequences of treaty interpretation can be viewed in welfare terms 
(regarding the efficiency and distributive consequences of a particular 
interpretation) and in participatory terms (regarding the quality and extent of 
participation in the decision-making processes at issue). In terms of participation, 
we refer to the effect of a WTO interpretive choice on the allocation of authority 
over a particular issue to different social decision-making processes, such as 
domestic political and administrative processes, international political and 
administrative processes, markets, and judicial bodies. In each of these social 
decision-making processes, individuals’ perspectives are directly or indirectly 
represented and mediated in different ways. Regardless of how imperfect 
participation may be in each alternative social decision-making process implicated 
by WTO texts and their interpretation, the imperfections will not be the same, as 
we demonstrate with numerous examples. The goal, of course, is to choose the 
best among imperfect alternatives. 
Our single analytic framework captures these two approaches to analysis (welfare-
based and participation-based). In our framework, participation-based criteria may 
be understood in welfarist terms, and vice versa. In situations where welfare 
consequences are difficult to calculate, the quality and extent of participation can 
serve as a proxy for both efficiency and distributive consequences. The different 
dynamics of participation characterizing different institutional fora will determine 
the pursuit of a particular social goal, whether it be resource allocation efficiency, 
justice as fairness, human rights, sustainable development, or some other goal.5 All 
of these goals are susceptible to inclusion in a welfarist analysis and all are 
captured within our framework. 
The remainder of this Article is divided into three parts. Part I presents an analytical 
template for comparative institutional analysis of treaty design and interpretive 
choice regarding dispute settlement. Part II describes the underlying structure of 
institutional choice for dispute settlement at the WTO made by the treaty drafters. 
These institutional choices shape, but do not determine, judicial interpretation, in 
particular because abstract language frequently contains compromises between 
conflicting positions, may be ambiguous, and, in any case, inevitably needs to be 
applied to particular contexts that vary over time. Part III then assesses the 
implications for social decision-making processes of the interpretive choices made 
within WTO dispute settlement. It evaluates each of these choices in comparative 
welfare and participatory terms, and provides examples from WTO case law. The 
Article concludes by explaining how this analytical framework enables greater 
understanding and precision in the choice among alternative institutional processes. 
                                                 
5 See Komesar, 2008, 170 (“[P]articipation is the heart of key economics concepts such as transaction 
costs, externalities and resource allocation efficiency. Transaction costs are the costs of market 
participation. Externalities are failures of market participation where missing transactions give rise to 
allocative decisions that do not reflect all costs and benefits. Resource allocation efficiency is defined by 
transaction costs and violated by externalities and is, therefore, a participation-based notion.”). 
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2. The Parameters of Institutional Choice in Dispute Settlement and 
Interpretation 
New institutional economics proposes that individuals, firms, and states select 
institutional devices in order to maximize welfare benefits and minimize transaction 
costs and strategic costs.6 We may understand not only private ordering decisions, 
but also mechanisms for majority voting, administrative delegation, and dispute 
settlement, in institutional terms. We may also understand and compare different 
interpretive approaches in these terms, although there has been much less work in 
this area. The designers of international dispute settlement do not exercise 
extensive control over the second-order decision-making of judicial bodies, which is 
likely why new institutional economics has attended less to this phenomenon.7 Yet, 
general interpretive approaches and particular interpretive choices can be examined 
in terms of their costs and benefits in social welfare terms. In a related way, they 
can be understood in terms of their effect on the form and level of participation in 
decision-making, which can serve as a proxy for assessing social welfare. 
Our discussion of welfare effects will be relatively straightforward. While we are 
normatively interested in public interest-type economic welfare, we also recognize, 
descriptively, that in the international relations context, institutions may be chosen 
to promote public choice-type welfare: the welfare of government officials.8 To the 
extent that the domestic political system successfully aligns public choice-type 
welfare with public interest-type welfare — that is, to the extent that the domestic 
political system is responsive — these measures of welfare are congruent. We also 
recognize that in the trade context, the fundamental theorem of welfare economics 
will often (but not always) align national and global public interest welfare with 
liberalized trade. A particular challenge arises when trade liberalization goals 
interact with other social policy preferences. In addition to considering the welfare 
and public choice efficiency of interpretive choices, we must also consider the 
distributive effects of interpretive choices. 
While we examine welfare and public choice efficiency separately from participation, 
we believe that participation can be understood in welfarist terms, and so this 
separation is in important respects artificial. Welfare analysis is based on 
methodological and normative individualism: Welfare only exists in terms of the 
preferences of individuals. If we are to analyze welfare from outside the mind of an 
individual, we must refer to revealed preferences. In the economics of market 
behavior, these revealed preferences are analyzed through purchases and sales, 
and equilibrium pricing. But preferences can be inferred from other behaviors as 
well. One such behavior that affects and interacts with market activity is political 
participation, which involves both individuals and interest groups. In this sense, 
participation is not an alternative to welfare, but rather a method of gauging 
welfare through revealed preferences. In each case, individual preferences are only 
imperfectly revealed in the real world because all institutions suffer from biases and 
distortions, which is why comparative institutional analysis becomes essential. 
Turning to judicial interpretation, different interpretive choices with respect to a 
legal text can be viewed as affecting participation by allocating authority over an 
issue to different social decision-making processes, in which individuals are able to 
participate to different degrees. This variation affects the articulation, mediation, 
and attainment of their preferences, and thus of social welfare.  
In addition, participation may be understood intrinsically as a preference: 
Individuals may value the possibility for participation separately from their ability to 
                                                 
6 See generally Aoki, 2001; Greif, 2006; North, 1990;. Williamson, 1985. 
7 We review the mechanisms of control available to the designers of international dispute settlement in 
Part II. By second-order decision-making, we mean judicial interpretation of a rule or standard created 
by the negotiator-signatories of an agreement (i.e., the first-order decision-makers). 
8 Public-interest and public-choice welfare are terms-of-art used in law and economics. See, e.g., 
Shaviro, 1990, 116. 
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affect decisions that participation provides them. We do not have an empirical 
method by which to separate this second welfare role for participation, but we 
recognize that it may be significant in many contexts. Our discussion of 
participation generally recognizes that greater accountability, transparency, and 
opportunities for input in different social decision-making processes will often be 
valued in themselves, as well as for articulating and furthering other individual 
preferences. 
Within the overall category of participation, we examine the relative degree of 
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy that a particular interpretive choice 
entails. By transparency, we mean the extent to which the decision-making is 
observable by citizens. By accountability, we mean the extent to which decision-
making can be influenced by citizens. By legitimacy, we mean the overall extent to 
which citizens believe that the interpretive choice has been structured so as to 
provide a fair and accurate method by which to reflect citizen preferences. 
Finally, we stress that institutions interact. Judicial interpretation is part of this 
dynamic process of institutional interaction, horizontally and vertically, across 
different levels of social organization.9 In this Article, we offer an improved means 
for understanding and assessing the choices made in connection with WTO treaty 
drafting and judicial interpretation. We focus attention on the importance of 
understanding and weighing the relative benefits and detriments of allocating 
authority to alternative social decision-making processes, ultimately affecting who 
decides a policy issue, thereby affecting social welfare. 
3. Institutional Choices in Treaty Drafting: Rules, Standards, Interpretive 
Guidelines, and Ex Post Supervision 
WTO Members make institutional choices in writing WTO treaties. Formally, 
Members have delegated the task of “clarifying” the meaning of the provisions of 
the WTO agreements to the WTO Appellate Body and panels, with the instruction 
that such clarification be done “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation 
of public international law.”10 Treaty drafters also can circumscribe judicial 
authority, both formally and informally, through the precision of the text drafted, by 
providing rules for the interpretive process, and by challenging, obstructing, 
refusing to recognize, and potentially overruling by treaty amendment the 
interpretive choices that judges make. These latter capacities can be exercised ex 
post in response to interpretive choices, but they can also induce judges to shape 
their interpretive choices ex ante in anticipation of Member reactions. There may 
also be circumstances where judges are reluctant to fill in what they feel are gaps 
in the law’s coverage, possibly in anticipation of Members’ responses. 
3.1. Rules versus Standards 
First, in drafting the substantive WTO agreements, Members can circumscribe ex 
ante the interpretive function through the precision of the agreed-upon text. This 
drafting choice is encapsulated in the distinction between specific rules and general 
standards.11 The more precisely the parties draft the text of an agreement — i.e., 
the more that the text constitutes a specific rule — the less discretion is available to 
a WTO panel. The more open-ended the drafting — i.e., the more that it constitutes 
a general standard — the more discretion is accorded to a panel. For example, 
Annex I to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties provides a 
detailed illustrative list of twelve prohibited export subsidies, which in turn refers to 
guidelines for determination of particular export subsidies set forth in Annexes II 
and III.12 In contrast, Article XX of the GATT, which provides exceptions for WTO 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Eskridge, 1994, 48-80; Eskridge and Ferejohn 2010, 266-76. 
10 Understanding on Rules, 1994, art. 3.2. 
11 See Trachtman, 1990, 350. 
12 Agreement on Subsidies, 1994. 
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obligations, uses more open-ended language, such as the concept of “unjustifiable 
discrimination.”13 
Why would negotiators choose a broader standard, implicitly delegating more 
authority to dispute settlement over the text’s meaning? In some cases, parties 
may choose compromise language to paper over their differences, resulting in more 
open-ended text to interpret. Parties may deem it too costly to attempt to 
anticipate every context in which a text might be applied, and so draft more 
general language for the delegated interpreter to apply subsequently to particular 
situations. Where an agreement involves multiple parties, such as the WTO 
agreements, the parties are likely to resort more frequently to general standards, 
as opposed to specific rules, in order to reduce the transaction costs of reaching 
agreement.14 
Thus, the relative degree of specificity of treaty obligations — between the most 
specific rules and the most general standards — is inversely proportional to the 
extent of delegation to judges. Specificity is thus indicative of institutional choice by 
treaty drafters, as between legislative determination through rules and judicial 
determination based on standards. Wherever room has been left for interpretation, 
we can infer that either an explicit or an implicit institutional choice has been made: 
to delegate more or less responsibility to judges. 
To the extent that the WTO treaty is understood as a contract freely entered into, 
we can assume that specific rules agreed among the parties are designed to 
maximize welfare. Whether negotiators are maximizing economic welfare or public 
choice welfare depends on the accountability of the negotiators to their own 
citizens. We also can assume that a freely concluded treaty has reasonable 
distributive consequences, if we ignore strategic problems and asymmetric 
allocation of power. In terms of transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, these 
specific rules draw a great deal from the domestic processes of negotiation and 
ratification: If domestic politics are transparent, accountable, and legitimate, the 
rules produced are more likely to be so as well. 
Broader standards, on the other hand, raise greater issues. We assume that, given 
the costs of specification, it was more efficient (either from a welfare or from a 
public choice perspective, or both) to establish standards, but it is less clear that 
the actual application of the standard by a judge will meet these efficiency 
criteria.15 Further, the application of standards may seem lacking in transparency, 
accountability, and legitimacy because unelected judges are making the ultimate 
decision. It seems easy for critics to forget that the allocation of authority to judges 
under standards derives from the same type of political processes that produce 
specific rules. The delegation of authority to less participatory judicial processes 
nonetheless can be vulnerable to criticism, even where the initial delegation itself 
seems satisfactory from a participatory standpoint, and even where the delegation 
may be justifiable in welfare terms. 
                                                 
13 GATT, 1994, art. XX. 
14 Some law and economics scholars, writing from an economic welfare perspective, view international 
agreements as “incomplete contracts” and states as delegating the interpretation of these contracts to 
international tribunals because it is less costly to them than to negotiate more explicit terms up front. 
See Horn et al., 2010, 394 (“We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and 
as a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. . . . We argue that taking contracting costs 
explicitly into account can help explain . . . key features of real trade agreements.”); Schwartz and 
Sykes, 2002, S180–81 (“The point of departure is the proposition that the WTO agreements are, in 
effect, contracts among the political actors who negotiated and signed them. As with all contracts, it is in 
the interest of the signatories to maximize the joint gains from trade, that is, to enable the signatories to 
attain their Pareto frontier. . . . [W]e will argue that the WTO provisions respecting renegotiation and the 
settlement of disputes over breach of obligations are carefully designed to facilitate efficient adjustments 
to unanticipated circumstances.”); Ethier, 2001 (“This paper interprets dispute settlement procedures 
and punishments as responses to the fact that trade agreements are incomplete contracts.”). 
15 See Posner, 2003, 532-33. 
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3.2. Delegation to Other International Organizations or Processes 
Second, while (as discussed below) the WTO dispute settlement process generally 
declines to apply or to determine rights and duties under non-WTO substantive 
international law, in certain cases, the drafters of WTO texts have specifically 
incorporated non-WTO international law by reference. The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), for example, 
incorporates by reference portions of the following treaties: the Paris Convention 
(on industrial property), the Berne Convention (on copyrights), the Rome 
Convention (on performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasters), and the 
Washington Treaty (on integrated circuits).16 
The drafters have also partially incorporated into WTO texts the decisions of other 
international bodies, even when those decisions are made subsequently and are 
voluntary under the rules of those other bodies, and thus do not necessarily 
achieve the status of international law. Certain provisions of the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Standards (SPS Agreement) are examples of the latter alternative, as 
they refer to international standards adopted through particular international 
standard-setting bodies.17 Members are required to base their domestic standards 
on these international ones, subject to certain exceptions. 
There are three international organizations expressly recognized by the SPS 
Agreement for the adoption of harmonized international food, plant, and animal 
health protection standards: the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International 
Plant Protection Committee (IPPC), and the International Office of Epizootics 
(OIE).18 The organizational rules of these three bodies provide for the adoption of 
standards by either a simple majority vote (for food and animal health standards 
under the Codex Alimentarius Commission and OIE) or a two-thirds majority vote 
(for plant protection standards under the IPPC).19 WTO Member regulations that 
implement these international standards are presumed to be legal under the SPS 
Agreement.20 Although the TBT Agreement does not expressly reference particular 
bodies as international standard-setting bodies, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement 
requires that Members use “relevant international standards” “as a basis for” their 
technical regulations, subject to certain exceptions.21 These standards are often 
adopted by hybrid public-private bodies, such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO).22 
The fact that a “legislative” act, in connection with sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards, and to a lesser extent other product standards, takes place outside the 
WTO imparts some interesting features. First, it can provide the WTO a degree of 
insulation from criticism with respect to legitimacy, since the decision regarding the 
appropriate standard is made through another political process. Second, it provides 
                                                 
16 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects, 1994, art. 1.3 (“Members shall accord the treatment provided 
for in this Agreement to the nationals of other Members. (1) In respect of the relevant intellectual 
property right, the nationals of other Members shall be understood as those natural or legal persons that 
would meet the criteria for eligibility for protection provided for in the Paris Convention (1967), the 
Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Integrated Circuits, were all Members of the WTO members of those conventions. (2) Any Member 
availing itself of the possibilities provided in paragraph 3 of Article 5 or paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the 
Rome Convention shall make a notification as foreseen in those provisions to the Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.”). 
17 See Büthe, 2008. 
18 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary, 1994, art. 12(3). 
19 See Pollack and Shaffer, 2009. 
20 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary, 1994, art. 3.2 (WTO members’ “[s]anitary or phytosanitary 
measures which conform to international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to 
be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the 
relevant provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994.”). 
21 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1994. 
22 See Mattli and Büthe, 2003 (describing and analyzing the International Organization for 
Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission). 
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a legislative device that may evade the need for consensus within the WTO. This 
avoidance of consensus may raise legitimacy challenges.23 Codex Alimentarius and 
other standard-setters can provide opportunities for less rigorous voting 
requirements for adoption of international rules.24 Third, this structure provides an 
opportunity for subject-matter specialists, as opposed to trade officials, to take the 
lead role in formulating the relevant standards. 
From the perspective of economic welfare, this type of delegation to international 
standard-setting bodies may reduce the possibility for protectionist formulation of 
national standards, and may thereby promote economic efficiency. Efficiency also 
may be enhanced by the expertise deployed by these bodies. Nonetheless, these 
decision-making processes are also subject to capture by certain interests, such as 
large industrial interests, which has prompted criticism.25 Because of the 
imperfections in transparency and accountability that may characterize these 
standard-setting bodies, granting significant authority to the standards adopted by 
them can raise legitimacy concerns. 
Reference by WTO bodies to these externally produced standards often displaces 
the type of judicial scrutiny that might otherwise be applied to national standards 
regarding, for instance, their scientific or non-discriminatory basis. So it is useful to 
examine the efficiency and participation characteristics of these references to 
international bodies in comparison to other institutional alternatives, such as 
judicial determination. In Part III below, we discuss the interpretation by panels 
and the Appellate Body of references to rules established by international standard-
setting bodies, while in this subsection we have discussed the initial institutional 
choice by treaty authors to specify these references. 
3.3. Specifying Interpretive Rules 
Third, states may choose to instruct judges on how to exercise their authority, or 
they may leave the choice over interpretive rules to the judges. WTO Members 
provided instructions regarding interpretation. Formally, the WTO Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, or DSU) instructs panels to interpret texts “in 
accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”26 
The customary rules of interpretation have been codified in Articles 31 and 32 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),27 and the Appellate Body 
referenced the VCLT in sixty-two of its first ninety-six decisions (65%), starting 
with its first decision in United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline in April 1996.28 Article 31.1 provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”29 Not 
surprisingly, panels and the Appellate Body frequently commence their 
                                                 
23 Similarly, Annex 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) 
grants to a subset of WTO Members the ability to decide which export credit practices will not be 
considered export subsidies, and thus will be permitted by the agreement. Controversially, this subset of 
Members consists solely of OECD Members. Item K of Annex 1 provides that “if a Member is a party to 
an international undertaking on official export credits to which at least twelve original Members to this 
Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted by 
those original Members), or if in practice a Member applies the interest rates provisions of the relevant 
undertaking, an export credit practice which is in conformity with those provisions shall not be 
considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement.” Agreement on Subsidies, 1994, Annex 1. 
Such delegation raises legitimacy issues because a subset of Members can create rules, albeit of limited 
scope, affecting the entire WTO membership. 
24 See Shaffer, 2008, 34. 
25 Id. at 3. 
26 Understanding on Rules, 1994, art. 3.2. 
27 VCLT, 1969, art. 31, 32. 
28 Appellate Body Report US–Gasoline, 1996. 
29 VCLT, 1969, art. 31.1. 
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interpretations by examining the “ordinary meaning” of the text, often citing 
dictionaries regarding that meaning. A search of the first ninety-six rulings of the 
Appellate Body found that a dictionary was cited in sixty-seven decisions regarding 
the “ordinary meaning” of a term (constituting 70% of these Appellate Body 
rulings). While the VCLT is by no means a detailed guide to interpretation, it 
provides at least some circumscription of the interpretative process. 
                                                
Article 31.2 delineates the “context” to be referenced in interpreting a treaty 
provision. It defines “context” to include, first, the text of the agreement, including 
its preamble and annexes; second, “any agreement relating to the treaty which was 
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty”; and 
third, “any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty.”30 In other words, the VCLT circumscribes the meaning of 
“context,” which does not, by its terms, encompass factual, social, or historical 
context. The Appellate Body nonetheless has stated that interpretation under Article 
31 is “a holistic exercise that should not be mechanically subdivided into rigid 
components,” such that a panel may consider particular surrounding factual 
circumstances, whether “under the rubric of ‘ordinary meaning’ or ‘in the light of its 
context.’”31 
Articles 31(3) and 32, moreover, further broaden the interpretive enterprise to take 
into account other sources. Article 31(3) requires interpreters to consider: 
a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties.32 
This last provision raises the question of the role of non-WTO international law in 
interpretation, including customary international law and other international 
treaties. Finally, Article 32 provides that a dispute settlement panel may refer to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to Article 31:  
a)  leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
b)  leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.33 
The guidance that Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT provide to treaty interpreters, and 
the specific reference to “customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law” in Article 3.2 of the DSU, constitute an institutional choice by the treaty 
drafters. The negotiators of the DSU chose to avoid immediate reference to the 
travaux préparatoires (preparatory work) of WTO treaties, but rather to require 
interpreters to focus first on text. This focus on text may be understood from a 
welfare perspective, and from a participation perspective in light of the fact that all 
treaties, like all contracts, are incomplete. 
From a welfare perspective, we assume (as with private contracts) that freely 
agreed treaty provisions are designed by the parties to maximize their joint 
welfare. If so, then an interpretive rule that focuses on text can be viewed as 
enhancing Member welfare by empowering the choices of WTO Members and 
constraining the discretion of judges. Of course, there are important limits to the 
 
30 Id. art. 31.2. 
31 Appellate Body Report EC–Chicken, 2005. 
32 VCLT, 1969, art. 31(3). 
33 Id. art. 32. 
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assumption underlying this analysis, especially in the WTO context, because 
strategic problems and power asymmetries may affect the parties’ ability to 
formulate welfare-maximizing treaty provisions. Second, the parties to the treaty 
may be maximizing political welfare, in a public choice sense, as opposed to public 
interest welfare. In that case, the social welfare arising from the drafting choice will 
depend on the relative congruence between the political welfare of government 
officials and national and global social welfare. 
From a participation perspective, the focus on text can be viewed as an instruction 
to give primacy to the political branches that formulated the treaty, rather than to 
the judicial process. The focus on text, from this perspective, constitutes a decision 
to attempt to retain relative authority within the legislative process, as opposed to 
transferring greater authority to the judiciary. Nonetheless, by limiting the use of 
travaux préparatoires, treaty negotiators are also reducing their ability to have 
their intent, as opposed to their words, be the primary reference point in 
interpretation. Alternatively, this choice of interpretive methodology might be 
understood in terms of allocating relative authority between legislatures and 
executives in national political processes. By focusing on text, parliaments or other 
bodies that approve international agreements have greater certainty regarding the 
meaning of the treaty terms that they have approved. It is the text that they 
approved that has primacy, not the intent of negotiators reflected in the travaux 
préparatoires, which may or may not reflect the legislature’s intent. The focus on 
text, and not travaux préparatoires, in interpreting WTO agreements, in other 
words, can be viewed in terms of its indirect impact on participation, raising the 
issues of relative transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, as this textual focus 
can empower national legislatures in relation to both national negotiators and 
international adjudicators, compared to other alternatives. 
WTO Members have also attempted to constrain treaty interpretation of particular 
provisions by assigning particular interpretive rules to them. For instance, Article 
17.6 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement provides for a degree of deference to 
national interpretation of law in WTO challenges to anti-dumping decisions made by 
domestic authorities.34 Article 17.6 (ii) provides that “[w]here the panel finds that a 
relevant provision of the [Anti-Dumping] Agreement admits of more than one 
permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’ measure to be in 
conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible 
interpretations.”35 The United States pushed for this rule in order to retain greater 
discretion in applying U.S. anti-dumping regulations under WTO rules.36 In practice, 
however, many commentators believe that the Appellate Body has been 
unconstrained by this interpretive rule, paying it no more than lip service when 
interpreting the meaning of the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.37 
3.4. Retaining a Veto 
Fourth, even after they have delegated interpretive authority, WTO Members can 
exercise some formal ex post oversight of the interpretation of WTO texts. 
However, they retain fewer checks on the judicial interpreter than under the 
predecessor regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Under the 
GATT, to form a panel required a consensus decision of all GATT Contracting 
Parties.38 Thus, any party, including the respondent, could block the panel’s 
                                                 
34 Agreement GATT Article VI, 1994, art. 17.6. 
35 Id. 
36 See Croley and Jackson, 1996, 199-200 (describing negotiations over Art. 17.6); Stewart and Burr, 
1998 (“The United States also insisted on an arguably different standard of review of legal 
interpretations in the anti-dumping and countervailing duty area.”). 
37 See, e.g., Tarullo, 2002, 112-13 (stating that “the special standard of review has had virtually no 
impact on the review of national anti-dumping measures by the WTO”); Van Damme, 2010,, 508–09 
(describing ineffectiveness of Article 17.6). 
38 Jackson, 2000, 123; Ginsburg, 2005, 650 (noting that formation of panels under GATT required 
consensus). 
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formation. Likewise, adoption of the panel ruling required consensus, so that any 
GATT Contracting Party, including the losing party, could block the ruling and thus 
its interpretive implications.39 
The DSU, however, created a “reverse consensus” rule so that the formation of a 
panel or the adoption of a panel ruling can only be blocked if no WTO Member 
objects to blocking such formation or adoption, including, respectively, the 
respondent and winning party.40 This rule effectively makes WTO dispute 
settlement automatic and delegates greater powers of interpretation to WTO panels 
and the Appellate Body. The formal adoption of an Appellate Body or panel ruling 
by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body is, as a result, pro forma. 
WTO Members still can amend the texts where they disagree with the interpretation 
made by a WTO panel or the Appellate Body, constituting a kind of “legislative 
veto.” Amending texts, however, can be quite difficult, even in domestic legal 
systems with legislatures where approval is by simple majority.41 In the WTO 
context, it is particularly difficult given that the agreements are changed only with 
the consensus of the WTO membership, which included 153 Members as of June 
2011.42 Although the formal WTO rules provide for amendment or formal 
interpretation by Members with less than a consensus vote, these voting rules have 
not been used in practice.43 The result, from an institutional perspective, is again 
considerable delegation of interpretive authority to WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body. Because of the prevailing norm of decision-making by consensus, the WTO 
political/legislative system, in contrast to its judicial system, is relatively inflexible 
and weak.44 
The possibility of legislative reversal, if it were practically effective, would 
derivatively display some of the same efficiency and participation characteristics as 
the original treaty-making. It would involve direct action by negotiators, with 
whatever efficiency, transparency, accountability, and legitimacy characteristics 
appertain to such action. 
3.5. Interpretive Communities and Member Defiance 
Fifth, the WTO Appellate Body and panels also face non-formal constraints that 
inform their interpretive choices regarding WTO texts. Most importantly, the 
discretion of the Appellate Body and panels is cabined in terms of the accepted 
meaning of the text within a larger interpretive community that includes (first) the 
Members themselves, and in particular the most active users of the DSU, which 
tend to be the largest traders, and (second and more broadly) business and civil 
society organizations, social movements, academics, and so forth.45 In addition, a 
                                                 
39 For example, shortly before the WTO’s formation, the United States blocked the adoption of 
controversial GATT decisions regarding the relationship of environmental protection measures and trade 
commitments in the two tuna-dolphin cases. Report of the Panel US Tuna, 1994; Report of the Panel US-
-Tuna, 1991, ¶ 155. 
40 Jackson, 2004, 114 (describing “reverse consensus” mechanism). 
41 Calabresi, 1982, 21-26 (discussing obstacles to moving legislation through Congress). 
42 World Trade Org., 2011. 
43 Article IX:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO provides for a general rule on WTO 
decision-making that “except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by 
consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting,” and, in such a case, by a simple majority of 
the votes cast. Article X provides for a specific rule on amendments, providing for a two-thirds majority 
vote, subject to some complications depending on whether an amendment would alter substantive rights 
and obligations. Articles IX:2 and IX:3 provide respectively for a three-fourths majority vote for 
authoritative interpretations of the texts and for the waiver of any obligations of a member. Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization arts. IX & X, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; 
see also Posner and Reif, 2000, 504-05. 
44 See, e.g., Ehlermann and Ehring, 2005, 516–19. 
45 See, e.g., Steinberg, 2004 (arguing that evaluation of the WTO dispute settlement system should take 
into account the extent to which the Appellate Body is constrained by international legal discourse, 
politics, and constitutional structure). See generally Fish, 1989 (providing a constructivist approach to 
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panel can anticipate the likely WTO Member reactions to its interpretive choice. In 
fact, Article 3.4 of the DSU arguably instructs a panel to consider Member 
responses by requiring that a panel’s rulings “shall be aimed at achieving a 
satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations 
under this Understanding and under the covered agreements.”46 WTO law is a 
social ordering and transaction-facilitating mechanism and, in particular, a 
mechanism for managing ongoing trade relations of Members over time. WTO 
panelists and Appellate Body members enhance their authority and legitimacy, and 
thus their status, if they promote this basic function.47  
                                                                                                                                              
If a Member refuses to comply with a decision, and if such defiance becomes 
relatively systematic, the authority of the Appellate Body and WTO panels can be 
undermined. A Member’s defiance is strengthened if its arguments regarding 
interpretation are supported by a broader community of interpreters. WTO panels 
and the Appellate Body can anticipate these responses, recursively affecting their 
interpretive choices. In this way, WTO judicial decision-making can be viewed as 
“interdependent” with other decision-making processes, such as political processes, 
as well as with broader social processes involving interpretive communities.48 
4. Judicial Interpretive Choice within WTO Dispute Settlement as 
Institutional Choice 
Legal texts are always indeterminate at some level, which is why their meaning is 
intensely debated and reasonable interpreters often disagree. Under all interpretive 
theories and methodologies, there are inevitably disagreements regarding a WTO 
text’s meaning. What, for example, is the meaning of “like product” in the various 
agreements? The Appellate Body has found that it varies depending on the context, 
writing in the Japan–Alcoholic Beverages case that: 
[t]he concept of “likeness” is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. 
The accordion of “likeness” stretches and squeezes in different places as different 
provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied . . . [in relation to] the context and 
the circumstances that prevail in any given case….49 
Similarly, what is the meaning of “exhaustible natural resources” in Article XX of 
the GATT? The Appellate Body said that the meaning of the term “natural 
resources” is “not ‘static’ . . . but is rather ‘by definition, evolutionary.’”50 What if 
two provisions could apply, potentially leading to different results, with one setting 
forth a more general standard and the other a more specific rule? In the WTO anti-
dumping zeroing cases against the United States, for example, a series of dispute 
settlement panels agreed with the United States that the practice of zeroing was 
permitted in certain circumstances by the detailed wording of subsections of Article 
2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.51 Nonetheless, the Appellate Body has 
 
interpretation and interpretive communities); Johnstone, 2003, 443-44 (discussing the concept of 
interpretive communities in international law). 
46 Understanding on Rules, 1994, art. 3.4. 
47 See, e.g., Steinberg, 2004. See generally Posner, 1993 (presenting an economic theory of the 
behavior of appellate judges). 
48 For a related perspective, see Ginsburg, 2005, 633; see also Fuller, 1968 (“The interpretation of 
statutes is, then, not simply a process of drawing out of the statute what its maker put into it but is also 
in part, and in varying degrees, a process of adjusting the statute to the implicit demands and values of 
the society to which it is to be applied.”). 
49 Appellate Body Report Japan–Alcoholic, 1996, 21. 
50 Appellate Body Report US—Shrimp 1, 1998, ¶ 130. The Appellate Body has also held that the words 
“must be read . . . in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the 
protection and conservation of the environment.” Id. ¶ 129. See also Panel Report US—Gambling, 2004, 
¶ 6.461 (“[T]he content of these concepts [of public morals and public order] can vary in time and 
space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious 
values.”). 
51 Agreement on GATT Article VI ,1994, Annex 1A. The United States argued that the dumping margin 
permitted by Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement “can be interpreted as applying on a transaction-
specific basis.” Appellate Body Report US–Dumping Margins, 2006, ¶ 128; see also Panel Report US–
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maintained that the general provision of Article 2.4 of that agreement, which 
provides that “[a] fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the 
normal value,” effectively prohibits the use of zeroing.52 
In short, the analysis of a text’s “ordinary meaning” can only get an interpreter so 
far. In some cases, that meaning is generally settled among all affected parties, 
which makes that case “easy.” In many cases, however, the meaning of a particular 
provision, at times in light of other provisions in the WTO texts and other 
international law, may be highly contested as applied to different factual contexts. 
What does a panel do in such cases? Although constrained in the interpretation of 
WTO texts, the Appellate Body and panels retain important interpretive choices, 
and these choices implicate the operation of other social decision-making 
processes, and ultimately affect social welfare. 
This section examines how WTO panels and the Appellate Body make interpretive 
decisions that can effectively delegate responsibility to different social decision-
making processes, including to national political and administrative processes; WTO 
political bodies; other international organizations with specific functional mandates, 
such as standard-setting organizations; international market processes (by 
stringently reviewing and ruling against national decisions that adversely affect 
imports); and the dispute settlement panels themselves, which are supported by 
the WTO secretariat (by engaging in judicial balancing and process-based review). 
In making these institutional choices, the Appellate Body and panels can re-allocate 
decision-making authority over the issues at stake, including by delegating the 
determination of some underlying factual issues in disputes to experts having 
technical expertise, such as scientists and economists. These “delegations” and 
“allocations” of authority are, of course, not static. Rather, they should be viewed 
as part of ongoing processes of institutional interaction taking place over time 
regarding the meaning and application of the text.53 
Each of these interpretive choices, with its institutional implications, has different 
effects on welfare and participation. We look at each choice individually and 
comparatively in terms of its welfare, distributive, and participation implications, 
giving examples in each case from WTO case law. None of these institutional 
choices is perfect from the perspectives of social welfare maximization, distributive 
fairness, or the direct or indirect participation in decision-making of affected 
stakeholders. Under each alternative, stakeholder positions will be reflected and 
affected in different ways. Different interpretive choices can thus be analyzed using 
a comparative institutional analytic method that focuses on the relative implications 
of interpretive choices for welfare and participation. 
4.1. Allocation of Decision-Making to WTO Political Processes, or to Subsets of 
WTO Members 
The allocation of authority within the WTO can be evaluated in terms of horizontal 
and vertical allocations of powers, including the relationships among legislative, 
executive, and adjudicative institutions over time. While the WTO’s executive 
                                                                                                                                               
Dumping Steel, 2007, ¶ 7.70 (“[T]he United States argues that the Anti-Dumping Agreement cannot be 
interpreted to include a general prohibition on zeroing in all contexts.”). “Zeroing” is a method of 
determining the margin of dumping that compares the prices of individual export transactions against 
weighted average normal values and treats as zero the results of comparisons where the export price 
exceeds the weighted average normal value, instead of using the resulting negative dumping margin to 
reduce the margin of dumping. 
52 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report US–Dumping Lumber, 2006, ¶ 138 (“The term ‘fair’ is generally 
understood to connote impartiality, even-handedness, or lack of bias. For the reasons stated below, we 
consider that the use of zeroing under the transaction-to-transaction comparison methodology is difficult 
to reconcile with the notions of impartiality, even-handedness, and lack of bias reflected in the ‘fair 
comparison’ requirement in Article 2.4.”). 
53 Cf. Eskridge, 1994; Eskridge and Ferejohn, 2010, 272 (on institutional dynamism and the hydraulics 
of institutional interactions). 
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function is handled largely by the WTO secretariat and is relatively limited,54 the 
relationship between adjudication and legislation — between the judicial branch and 
the legislative branch — is of particular interest. The legislative branch, understood 
here as the Members in their treaty-making and treaty-oversight capacity, is 
theoretically omnipotent, but it only exercises its power after long rounds of 
negotiations, or in very limited and infrequent amendments and interpretive 
understandings. Thus, the interpretive choices of the Appellate Body and panels in 
the WTO dispute settlement system can easily affect the allocation of powers 
among decision-making processes. 
As we showed in Part II, the practice of voting by consensus makes it effectively 
impossible for Members to override an Appellate Body or panel decision. This 
difficulty affects the horizontal allocation of powers set up by the WTO agreements. 
These agreements provide for specific types of decision-making by the parties and 
delegate this authority to certain committees within the WTO, such as the 
Committee on Balance of Payments and the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements.55 Although still subject to the constraint of voting by consensus, the 
extensive WTO committee system represents a form of political decision-making 
that can be used to elaborate upon and guide the meaning of texts, and help 
mediate disputes before they lead to full litigation.56 In one anti-dumping case, for 
example, a dispute settlement panel referenced a recommendation of the 
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices in 2000 as providing the applicable norm to 
guide interpretation.57 Moreover, approximately seventy-five other international 
organizations hold observer status within the WTO, and WTO secretariat members 
attend the meetings of many of these international organizations on a reciprocal 
basis.58 These arrangements enable the secretariat and the trade representatives of 
the Members to be aware of developments in other areas of international law, and 
permit the secretariats and state representatives of other international 
organizations to be aware of the implications of WTO law for their respective areas. 
These political processes within WTO committees, however, have yet to prevent the 
dispute settlement system from exercising jurisdiction in matters falling within the 
committee’s areas of concern. For example, the Appellate Body has found that 
specific WTO treaty provisions confirm the availability of dispute settlement 
regarding the issues of whether a balance of payments exception or customs union 
exists, and it thus has interpreted and enforced these provisions.59 The specific 
assignment of decision-making authority to these political bodies has therefore not 
stopped the Appellate Body from issuing rulings over claims in these areas. Thus 
far, the Appellate Body has generally declined to recognize a form of “political 
                                                 
54 See Shaffer, 2005. 
55 Regarding balance of payments, see Understanding GATT, 1994, Annex 1A (supplementing the GATT 
and revising procedures for Committee action regarding measures taken for balance-of-payments 
purposes); Declaration on Trade Measures, 1980, 205-09 (describing procedures for Committee action 
regarding measures taken for balance-of-payments purposes);GATT arts. XII and XVIII, 1947, 194–254 
(describing control of measures taken for balance of payments purposes). Regarding regional trade 
agreements, see World Trade Organization, General Council, Decision of 6 February 1996, WT/L/127 
(1996), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/127.pdf (creating the Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements); Understanding Article XXIV of GATT, 1994 (modifying GATT art. XXIV); GATT, 1994, 
268–72 (relating to control of customs agreements and free trade agreements among GATT members). 
56 Lang and Scott, 2009, 586 (stating the ways in which WTO committees are “involved in the gradual 
development of shared norms”); id. at 587–88 (describing how committee work can lead to the 
avoidance of formal dispute mechanisms). 
57 See Panel Report EC–Cast Iron Tube, 2003, ¶ 7.321 & n.272; see also Stewart and Sanchez, 2011. 
58 See International Intergovernmental Organizations Granted Observer Status to WTO Bodies; see also 
Charnovitz, 2005.. 
59 Appellate Body Report India–Aricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, 1999, ¶ 87 (“Any doubts that 
may have existed in the past as to whether the dispute settlement procedures under Article XXIII were 
available for disputes relating to balance-of-payments restrictions have been removed by the second 
sentence of footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding . . . .”); see also Panel Report, Turkey–Restrictions on 
Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ¶ 9.50–.51, WT/DS34/AB/R, (May 31, 1999) (“We understand 
from the wording of paragraph 12 of the WTO Understanding on Article XXIV, that panels have 
jurisdiction to examine ‘any matters “arising from” the application of those provisions of Article XXIV.’”). 
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question” doctrine pursuant to which it will defer questions to the WTO’s political 
branches and refrain from ruling on particular WTO claims, at least in cases where 
it finds that the agreement at issue specifically confirms the availability of dispute 
settlement.60 Nor has it recognized a concept of non liquet, pursuant to which it 
would refuse to issue a ruling where it finds that existing WTO law does not cover 
an issue.61 As a result, WTO dispute settlement is available to interpret and enforce 
WTO provisions even where the application of these provisions is also expressly 
assigned to political decision-making or there is an alleged “gap” in the law. 
Importantly, the practice of voting by consensus has prevented political decision-
making in these cases, so that the judicial process can be viewed as deciding them 
by default. 
Through interpretation, the Appellate Body and panels can implicitly allocate 
decision-making to other political processes by signaling that they will take into 
account other agreements between the parties to a dispute. This issue arose, for 
instance, in the United States–Shrimp case. There, the Appellate Body’s report 
noted that the United States had successfully negotiated an Inter-American 
Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, which demonstrated 
that “multilateral procedures [were] available and feasible.”62 The Appellate Body 
found that the United States never seriously attempted to negotiate a similar 
agreement with the four Asian complainants. In this way, in the particular context 
of the chapeau (introductory paragraph) of Article XX of the GATT, the Appellate 
Body tried to foster an ad hoc political approach by requiring the United States to 
attempt to negotiate harmonized substantive rules before implementing a ban that 
could trigger a dispute before the WTO judicial process. When Malaysia 
subsequently challenged the United States for failing to reach a negotiated 
settlement through a multilateral process, the Appellate Body held that the United 
States only needed to engage in good-faith negotiations, but was not required to 
conclude an agreement.63 
In other words, in the United States–Shrimp case, the Appellate Body implicitly 
accepted the possibility that a subset of Members themselves might define, in its 
words, the “line of equilibrium” between regulatory restrictions and liberalized trade 
under the chapeau of Article XX.64 This decision can be viewed as setting a factual 
standard as to what types of national efforts will satisfy the requirements of the 
chapeau, while also re-delegating to subsets of Members implicated in a dispute the 
authority to decide on an arrangement pursuant to which the national trade 
restrictive measure would be able to meet Article XX requirements. Similarly, on 
the issue of opening hearings to the public (which have traditionally been closed), 
panels and the Appellate Body have chosen to defer to the decision of the litigating 
                                                 
60 Cf. Dunoff, 1999, 757–58 (1999) (calling for use of a political question doctrine). 
61 See, e.g., Steinberg, 2004, 258 (“Also at the restrained end of the continuum, various customary 
doctrines counsel abstention in dealing with a gap in the law. Some would invoke the doctrine of non 
liquet (which means ‘it is not clear’) if the law does not permit deciding a case one way or the other. 
According to that view, there are gaps in international law and it is not the place of courts to fill those 
gaps as they are not legislative organs; thus, in such cases courts should declare non liquet.”); see also 
Bartels, 2004, 874–75 (describing the potential use of non liquet in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings); Bourgeois, 1998, 271 (noting an argument that unregulated areas could be considered 
non liquet, allowing panels and the Appellate Body to refuse jurisdiction). 
62  Appellate Body Report US—Shrimp 1, 1998, ¶¶ 166–70. 
63 Appellate Body Report US—Shrimp 2, 2001, ¶¶ 122–23 (“Requiring that a multilateral agreement be 
concluded by the United States in order to avoid ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ in applying its 
measure would mean that any country party to the negotiations with the United States, whether a WTO 
Member or not, would have, in effect, a veto over whether the United States could fulfill its WTO 
obligations.”). 
64. Appellate Body Report US—Shrimp 1, 1998, ¶ 170 (“[T]he parties to the Inter-American Convention 
together marked out the equilibrium line”). See also id. ¶ 159. The obligation to negotiate was rejected 
by the Appellate Body in the Gambling case, in the context of the subheadings of Article XIV of GATS — 
in a provision equivalent to the necessity requirement of Article XX(b) of GATT. See Appellate Body 
Report US–Gambling, 2005. 
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states.65 This allocation of authority is, nonetheless, significantly more 
circumscribed, and more provision-specific, than allowing subsets of Members to 
vary their obligations inter se, which does not appear to be formally permitted by 
the WTO charter. 
It is impossible to evaluate this institutional choice of allocating authority to a 
subset of Members from the standpoint of economic welfare without addressing the 
competing priorities held by the affected parties, because this type of decision 
involves commensuration between diverse values. From the standpoint of political 
efficiency, in a public choice sense, such sub-multilateral arrangements are likely to 
be efficient, so long as they do not give rise to negative externalities upon the 
governments of other states. Similarly, if the arrangements do not result in 
negative externalities for other constituencies, then the arrangements can be 
viewed as more appropriate from a participatory perspective, again depending on 
the transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of the domestic politics of the 
subset of Members. By virtue of the political consensus among the contending 
states, concerns regarding both efficiency and participation are to some extent 
addressed. A number of commentators have thus contended that such international 
political processes should be institutionalized within the WTO,66 or outside of and in 
collaboration with it.67 However, it is likely that a rule of consensus or unanimity 
could often result in a minority blocking what might otherwise be a more efficient 
outcome, or an outcome that would enhance stakeholder participation. 
Overall, delegation of decision-making authority to an international political process 
is, like other institutional alternatives, subject to trade-offs from the standpoints of 
welfare and participation. Even if international political processes were made more 
robust, they would still be subject to biases arising from resource and power 
imbalances, collective action problems, and general citizen apathy toward distant 
fora. The bureaucracies of large, wealthy countries have greater resources, and 
larger, more experienced staffs. Interest groups from these countries are more 
likely than interest groups from developing countries to have the funding needed to 
represent their views at the international level. The development of international 
political governance mechanisms can nonetheless provide a focal point for political 
negotiations that can make the conflicting norms, priorities, and interests at stake 
in trade-social policy conflicts more transparent, potentially enhancing global 
welfare.68 By bringing developing country perspectives that might otherwise be 
suppressed in a litigation context to the fore, political bargaining might facilitate 
targeted financial transfers that would be more equitable and efficient in addressing 
environmental and development goals.69 Yet, political bargaining also intensifies the 
role of political leverage, and can provide better opportunities for strong states to 
prevail over the interests of weaker ones in the resolution of disputes. 
4.2. Recognition of Other International Political Processes through Taking 
Account of Other International Law 
One way for the judicial process to allocate authority to other political processes is 
through its treatment of other (non-WTO) international law. The question of what 
law is to be applied and interpreted in WTO dispute settlement raises treaty design 
and interpretive questions that have significant institutional implications. 
Application of, or reference to, non-WTO international law can be viewed as a way 
of effectively delegating decision-making authority to the non-WTO source 
                                                 
65 See Panel Report Canada Obligations, 2008, ¶¶ 7.41–7.51. This decision was subsequently modified 
by the Appellate Body. See Appellate Body Report US–Continued Suspension, 2008, ¶ 11 (“For these 
reasons, the Division authorizes the public observation of the oral hearing in these proceedings on the 
terms set out below.”). 
66 Guzman, 2004, 305. 
67 See. Esty, 1994, 239–41 (advocating creation of a Global Environmental Organization); Shaffer, 2001.  
68 Shaffer, 2001, 13. 
69 Id. at 89–92. 
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institution, which may operate under a different framework of norms (such as 
environmental, human rights, or labor protection), and involve the participation of 
different actors. The drafters of the WTO agreements made certain choices clear, 
but left others open. Some of these have been raised in WTO disputes and have 
also been the subject of considerable academic commentary.70 
It is clear and undisputed that when states agreed in the Uruguay Round to the 
DSU, they did not create a court of general jurisdiction. As a result, only claims 
based on WTO law may be adjudicated under the DSU.71 This choice of 
international treaty design is certainly an important institutional one: The creation 
of a court capable of interpreting and applying claims under WTO law, but not 
authorized to entertain claims under other international law, empowers certain 
institutions, laws, and values in relation to others. 
ed on WTO law. 
                                                
Yet, there may be circumstances in which non-WTO law is relevant to a claim based 
on WTO law, raising questions of interpretive choice having institutional 
implications. For example, it may be that a multilateral environmental treaty or a 
customary rule of human rights law could be invoked as a defense to a WTO 
obligation. Under certain circumstances, a norm of customary international law 
(including but not limited to jus cogens) or another international treaty provision 
could trump a claim under WTO law, should the two conflict, and should the other 
norm (such as a jus cogens norm) occupy a superior hierarchical position. Non-
WTO rules of international law obviously may apply to state conduct. It is less clear 
whether, when states agreed to the DSU, they intended for panels and the 
Appellate Body to apply non-WTO international law. Panels and the Appellate Body 
are not courts of general jurisdiction, but what is the law that they are assigned to 
interpret and apply? 
The DSU does not explicitly specify the body of applicable law that WTO 
adjudicators are assigned to interpret and apply, although it does provide that the 
mandate to panels and the Appellate Body is “to clarify the existing provisions of 
the [WTO covered agreements],” which are listed in Appendix 1 to the DSU.72 The 
Appellate Body has said clearly that WTO adjudicators are not empowered to 
interpret non-WTO international law for purposes of applying non-WTO international 
law. In the Mexico–Soft Drinks case, the Appellate Body stated that it would be 
inappropriate for a panel to make a determination as to whether the United States 
had acted inconsistently with its NAFTA obligations.73 It declined to accept 
“Mexico’s interpretation[, which] would imply that the WTO dispute settlement 
system could be used to determine rights and obligations outside the covered 
agreements.”74 While the Appellate Body determined that it could not “determine 
rights and duties outside the covered agreements,” it did not explicitly state that it 
could not give effect to rights and duties outside the covered agreements in 
assessing claims bas
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT specifically instructs that interpreters shall consider 
“any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.” In the EC–Biotech case, the panel found it sensible “to interpret Article 
31(3)(c) as requiring consideration of those rules of international law which are 
applicable in the relations between all parties to the treaty which is being 
interpreted.”75 Therefore, only those international legal rules to which all Members 
are party, such as general customary international law or treaties that include all 
Members, would be required to be taken into account. The panel observed that 
“[r]equiring that a treaty be interpreted in the light of other rules of international 
 
70 See, e.g. Trachtman, 2005. 
71 Id. 
72 Understanding on Rules, 1994, art. 3.2. 
73 Appellate Body Report Mexico– Soft Drinks, 2006, ¶ 56. 
74 Id. 
75 Panel Report EC Biotech, 2006, ¶ 7.70. 
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law which bind the States parties to the treaty ensures or enhances the consistency 
of the rules of international law applicable to these States and thus contributes to 
avoiding conflicts between the relevant rules.”76 The panel thus made an 
institutional choice to limit the authority of other international political processes, a 
decision that was later criticized in an International Law Commission report.77 In 
the EC–Biotech case, since the complainants (as well as many other Members) had 
not ratified the Biosafety Protocol, the panel found that VCLT Article 31(3)(c) did 
not require it to take into account the Biosafety Protocol when interpreting the WTO 
treaty.78 
The Panel in the EC–Biotech case nonetheless left open the possibility that a panel 
would have discretion to take into account another international treaty where the 
parties to the dispute had each ratified that other treaty.79 In addition, it 
recognized that other rules of international law might inform the interpretation of 
the meaning of the WTO text as applied to a particular factual context, rather than 
as independent rules of applicable law. The Appellate Body in the early United 
States–Gasoline report memorably wrote that the GATT “is not to be read in clinical 
isolation from public international law.”80 Similarly, in the United States–Shrimp 
case, the Appellate Body referred to “modern . . . conventions and declarations” in 
order to interpret the terms “exhaustible” and “natural resources” in Article XX(g) 
of GATT.81 The Appellate Body did not mention that it was doing so pursuant to 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, but its decision clearly took into account other 
international law. The EC–Biotech panel also maintained, although in a more 
circumscribed manner, that: 
. . . other relevant rules of international law may in some cases aid a treaty 
interpreter in establishing, or confirming, the ordinary meaning of treaty terms in 
the specific context in which they are used. Such rules would not be considered 
because they are legal rules, but rather because they may provide evidence of the 
ordinary meaning of terms in the same way that dictionaries do.82 
This limited use of other international law in interpretation constitutes (once more) 
an implicit institutional choice: a decision to focus WTO dispute settlement, at least 
formally, on interpretation of the covered agreements in light of their context, 
object, and purpose, while limiting the scope for taking into account other 
international law. This decision not to take into account other international law in 
judicial interpretation on a general basis constitutes an institutional choice to assign 
                                                 
76 Id. 
77 See Study Group, 2006, ¶¶ 450, 472 (“The panel buys what it calls the ‘consistency’ of its 
interpretation of the WTO Treaty at the cost of the consistency of the multilateral treaty system as a 
whole. It aims to mitigate this consequence by accepting that other treaties may nevertheless be taken 
into account as facts elucidating the ordinary meaning of certain terms in the relevant WTO treaty. This 
is of course always possible and, as pointed out above, has been done in the past as well. However, 
taking ‘other treaties’ into account as evidence of ‘ordinary meaning’ appears a rather contrived way of 
preventing the ‘clinical isolation’ as emphasized by the Appellate Body. … A better solution is to permit 
reference to another treaty provided that the parties in dispute are also parties to that other treaty. … In 
addition, it might also be useful to take into account the extent to which that other treaty relied upon 
can be said to have been ‘implicitly’ accepted or at least tolerated by the other parties ‘in the sense that 
it can reasonably be considered to express the common intentions or understanding of all members as to 
the meaning of the . . . term concerned.’”). 
78 Argentina and Canada had signed the Biosafety Protocol but not ratified it, while the United States had 
not signed it. Argentina and Canada had signed and ratified the underlying Convention on Biodiversity, 
while the United States had signed it but not ratified it. 
79 Panel Report EC Biotech, 2006, ¶ 7.72. (“[I]t is important to note that the present case is not one in 
which relevant rules of international law are applicable in the relations between all parties to the dispute, 
but not between all WTO Members, and in which all parties to the dispute argue that a multilateral WTO 
agreement should be interpreted in the light of these other rules of international law. Therefore, we need 
not, and do not, take a position on whether in such a situation we would be entitled to take the relevant 
other rules of international law into account.”). 
80 Appellate Body Report US–Gasoline, 1996, 17. 
81 Appellate Body Report US—Shrimp 1, 1998, ¶¶ 130–32. 
82 Panel Report EC Biotech, 2006, ¶ 7.92. 
Gregory Shaffer, Joel Trachtman  Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 20 
to the political processes the job of reconciliation of diverse rules of international 
law. 
From a legal realist (non-formalist) perspective, nonetheless, a panel could take 
account of other international law without acknowledging it. The core legal realist 
claim is that, in practice, judges decide cases in response to factual context and not 
simply in response to formal rules and legal doctrine. Judges are viewed as situated 
decision-makers who respond to disputes in light of particular social, political, and 
historical contexts that shape their views of the facts of a particular case.83 The 
texts of agreements are seen as having a degree of malleability (or 
incompleteness) that can be adapted (or filled out) in light of these contexts.84 
This legal realist perspective on judicial interpretation has both rationalist and 
constructivist dimensions. From a rationalist perspective, an international judicial 
body wishes to avoid conflict with other international bodies that could spur 
challenges to its legitimacy and authority. It thus has incentives to interpret and 
apply legal provisions in a way that accommodates conflicting provisions in another 
regime when it can, even while it explicitly writes that it is not doing so, especially 
in high-stakes disputes that generate significant publicity and possibly mass 
protests. In this way, the Appellate Body can limit the tension between the WTO 
and other international regimes in a fragmented international law system and seek 
to limit political backlash against its decisions that touch on environmental, social, 
or other political issues, the potential of which is reinforced and signaled by such 
other regimes. From a constructivist perspective, a judicial body’s interpretation 
and application of a text will be informed by historical, political, and social context. 
The judicial body will be part of a “community of interpreters” of that text as 
applied within such a context.85 From this perspective, WTO jurists may be 
persuaded by and internalize principles and norms from neighboring international 
law regimes, and incorporate those principles and norms into their reading and 
application of WTO texts. One reason states negotiate some international 
agreements is to attempt to loosen the constraints of WTO rules.86 Through these 
other agreements, they seek to provide signals to WTO judicial decision-makers.87 
From a welfare perspective, is this current arrangement for dispute settlement of 
WTO and other international law efficient? Its efficiency depends in part on the 
relative efficiency of the substance of WTO law compared to other international law. 
In economics, trade liberalization is viewed as economically efficient for all states, 
enhancing both national and global welfare, subject to the caveat that some 
powerful states can, in some circumstances, enhance their economic welfare 
through trade restrictions at other states’ expense.88 
Further, from a welfare perspective, if we assume states are acting rationally, and if 
we assume that international law is not biased due to the exercise of asymmetric 
power or subject to other strategic problems (two large assumptions), then we can 
infer that states have determined that it would increase efficiency to provide for 
stronger enforcement of WTO law, while implicitly determining that it would not be 
as valuable to provide for equally strong enforcement of other international law. 
Given the need to make strong assumptions here, such an inference of efficiency in 
                                                 
83 See, e.g., Wells, 1990, 1728–31. Also of note is William Eskridge and Philip Frickey’s concept of 
“practical reasoning” in statutory interpretation, “eschew[ing] objectivist theories in favor of a mixture of 
inductive and deductive reasoning . . . seeking contextual justification . . . .” Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, 
1990, 322 n.3. 
84 See Nourse and Shaffer, 2009; Shaffer, 2008, 70; Trachtman, 2011. 
85 See, e.g., Fish, 1989; Johnstone, 2003; Steinberg, 2007.  
86 Shaffer and Pollack, 2010 (discussing the Biosafety Protocol and UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions as examples). 
87 Id.; see also Ginsburg, 2005, 634 (discussing legislative signaling in the international context). 
88 See generally Krugman and Obstfeld, 2000 (noting that states with terms of trade power are able to 
increase their own welfare by imposing tariffs on imports). Of course, not all WTO law embodies trade 
liberalization; some WTO law authorizes states to act illiberally. 
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a welfare sense rests on shaky ground. Stronger reasons exist to infer efficiency 
from the standpoint of maximizing the political welfare of government officials, in a 
public choice sense.89 From the perspective of political welfare, constituencies 
interested in WTO rules have been able to elevate the importance of WTO rules 
among government priorities. 
While it is clear that a limited mandate for the Appellate Body and panels’ 
jurisdiction accentuates the phenomenon of “fragmentation” of international law, 
pursuant to which different types of international law are separated both at the 
stages of negotiation and judicial application, it is also possible that states would 
prefer different types of dispute settlement mechanisms for different types of 
international law (such as trade, environmental, and human rights law). Thus, the 
acceptance by states of this type of fragmentation could be viewed as an 
acceptance of an institutional choice to differentiate among types of international 
law in terms of the available institutional infrastructure. States may, for example, 
only agree to the terms of certain international agreements because judicial 
enforcement is weak, thus leaving interpretation of the meaning of such terms to 
non-judicial processes. 
There are nonetheless welfare-oriented arguments for recognizing other 
international law in WTO dispute settlement in order to constrain trade 
liberalization. This choice can be understood from an “embedded liberalism” 
perspective that recognizes that in order to establish the political conditions for 
liberalism, it is necessary to engage in some measure of redistributive and other 
social regulation.90 The embedded liberalism concept links considerations of welfare 
economics with other political considerations. Redistributive regulation is viewed as 
necessary to induce those who would otherwise be hurt by liberalization to accept 
liberalization that will increase aggregate social welfare, and thus legitimize the 
regime. 
Finally, if WTO law always trumps other international law in WTO dispute 
settlement, this scenario raises issues of institutional choice from the perspective of 
participation. Those states and other actors participating in other international law 
regimes that do not benefit from automatic and binding dispute settlement are 
disfavored. Therefore, the de facto supremacy of WTO law would again call into 
question the legitimacy of establishing a de facto structural hierarchy through 
negotiations among trade officials, without extensive participation of officials 
responsible for other substantive areas. 
In sum, the exclusion of the determination of rights and duties under other 
international law from the mandate of WTO dispute settlement can be understood 
as an implicit institutional decision (whether made by treaty design or through 
interpretive choice): a decision to leave other international law to the general 
institutional mechanism for application and enforcement of international law (or to 
other discrete mechanisms), while providing a special mechanism for application 
and enforcement of WTO law. This move may be viewed as an implicit elevation of 
WTO law above other international law — a type of “structural supremacy” — and it 
therefore raises questions regarding the legitimacy of establishing a de facto 
structural hierarchy of international law through negotiations among trade officials. 
It can thus be argued that if the WTO dispute settlement process declines to give 
effect to broadly accepted values embodied in other international law, the WTO 
itself will lose legitimacy.91 
                                                 
89 See Schwartz and Sykes, 1996 (using public choice theory to explain aspects of WTO system); Sykes, 
1996; Sykes, 1991. 
90  Ruggie, 1998, 62, 73 (stating that the essence of the embedded liberalism compromise is that 
“multilateralism [is] predicated upon domestic interventionism”). 
91 See Howse, 2001, 386. 
Gregory Shaffer, Joel Trachtman  Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 22 
4.3. Textual Incorporation of Other International Law; Delegation to 
International Standard-Setting Bodies 
As discussed in Part II.B, the authors of the WTO treaties decided to delegate 
certain decision-making authority to external standard-setting bodies. However, the 
terms of this delegation allowed considerable room for interpretation by panels and 
the Appellate Body. In the EC–Sardines case, the Appellate Body examined the 
effect within the WTO legal system of an international standard for labeling in 
connection with sardines.92 The European Communities (EC) argued that the EC 
regulation was “based on” Codex Stan 94, as required by Article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement, because it adopted the portion of Codex Stan 94 that reserves the term 
“sardines” exclusively for sardina pilchardus.93 It argued that this relationship 
satisfies the requirement for a “rational relationship” between the international 
standard and the technical regulation, as required by Article 2.4. The Appellate 
Body ruled against the EC, finding that the Codex standard could not be the “basis” 
for the EC regulation since the EC regulation and the Codex standard were 
contradictory.94 This interpretation of the meaning of “basis” delineates the 
institutional relationship between the WTO and Codex Alimentarius. The Appellate 
Body agreed with the panel’s use of the earlier EC–Hormones decision, which had 
applied an analogous provision under the SPS Agreement.95 In the EC–Hormones 
case, the Appellate Body found that, in order for an international standard to be 
“used ‘as a basis for’ a technical regulation” under Article 3.1 of the SPS 
Agreement, that standard must be “used as the principal constituent or 
fundamental principle for the purpose of enacting the technical regulation.”96 
Incorporation by reference of other international treaties generally entails 
interesting interpretive problems regarding the meaning of these treaty provisions. 
Appellate Body interpretations of the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention 
have been subject to academic scrutiny and critique.97 
These interpretive choices can be assessed according to whether they have been 
faithful to the intent of the drafters of these provisions regarding the applications of 
rules produced outside the WTO. The use of these rules may be understood as 
adding to the welfare efficiency of these provisions, to the extent that the expertise 
brought to bear in the formulation of these rules helps to safeguard against the use 
of regulation for discriminatory, protectionist purposes. We discuss the role of 
expertise in more detail in Subpart D below. The Appellate Body also seems to have 
been careful to ensure that Members are not able to depart from these rules too 
widely, in keeping with the goal of minimizing protectionist use of technical 
standards. This seems to promote both welfare efficiency and political efficiency. To 
the extent that these rules are produced under circumstances of limited 
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, however, the Appellate Body’s 
applications of these provisions may raise issues of participation. Indeed, in the EC–
Sardines case, the Appellate Body accepted that international product standards 
may include not only those adopted by consensus, but also those that are adopted 
based on majority voting.98 
                                                 
92 Appellate Body Report EC-Hormones, 1998; Appellate Body Report EC–Sardines, 2002, ¶¶ 214, 243. 
93 Appellate Body Report EC-Hormones, 1998, ¶ 241. 
94 Id. ¶ 248.  
95 Id. ¶ 242 (citing Appellate Body Report EC-Hormones, 1998. ¶ 166). 
96 Appellate Body Report EC–Sardines, 2002, ¶ 243. 
97 See, e.g., Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, 2009, 1207–09 (criticizing WTO panel’s interpretation of the Berne 
Convention in Panel Report US–Copyright Act, 2000); Evans, 2007, 1021–22 (describing how the 
Appellate Body interpreted the Paris Convention in Appellate Body Report, US–Omnibus Appropriations 
Act, 2002); Gervais, 2009, 549–50 (describing WTO panel’s interpretation of the Berne Convention in 
Panel Decision, China–Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009)). 
98  Appellate Body Report EC–Sardines, 2002 ¶¶ 222–27.  
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4.4. Delegation to Experts Regarding Factual Issues 
In determining how to interpret textual language as applied to a specific factual 
setting, judicial bodies often seek expert advice. In the WTO context, they do so 
when deciding whether to defer broadly to national regulatory decisions or to 
subject them to stricter scrutiny, whether in terms of the substance of the claims or 
in terms of the domestic procedures used. 
This form of delegation of institutional authority can be viewed as technocratic, or 
expert-based. In requesting experts’ views and taking them into account, panels 
are engaging in a form of delegation, although this delegation is only a partial one, 
as the panels retain authority to determine how to make use of the experts’ views. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that the experts shape the perspectives of the panels 
regarding factual contexts, they may wield considerable authority.99 
In cases that raise environmental and health-related issues, WTO panels have 
typically called on experts to testify about these issues in order for the panels to 
weigh the factual evidence. Under Article 13.2 of the DSU, panels are permitted to 
establish “expert review groups.” This authority has not yet been used to create 
“expert review groups” per se,100 but it has been used by panels to receive 
testimony from experts on an individual basis regarding complex scientific and 
other determinations. Panels have done so in eight cases involving environmental, 
food safety, and phytosanitary questions: Australia–Salmon, EC–Asbestos (initial 
panel and Article 21.5 panel), Japan–Agricultural Products, Japan–Apples, EC–
Biotech, EC–Hormones, United States–Continued Suspension (a follow-up case to 
EC–Hormones), and United States–Shrimp. They have cited these experts’ views in 
support of their decisions.101 
For example, in EC–Biotech, the panel called on six scientific experts to testify, 
asking them detailed questions regarding the risks posed by particular genetically-
modified agricultural products and whether the EU member state bans on such 
products were supported by risk assessments.102 Similarly, the panel in United 
States–Shrimp used experts to examine environmental questions on which key 
legal issues turned.103 The panel asked the parties for a list of individuals having 
expertise on matters of sea turtle conservation, and then selected five marine 
biologists from this list to report to it as individual experts.104 The panel asked the 
experts detailed questions concerning the status of sea turtles in the complainants’ 
waters, their migratory patterns, the relative effectiveness of the complainants’ sea 
turtle conservation measures, the relation of shrimp trawling to sea turtle 
conservation, and the socio-economic conditions of the shrimping industry.105 In 
this way, WTO judicial bodies can try to take account of the trade, environmental, 
developmental, and other social interests and concerns at stake. 
                                                 
99  See, e.g., Lang, 2011; Chalmers, 2003.  
100. See Pauwelyn, 2003, 325. 
101 Appellate Body Report US–Continued Suspension, 2008; Panel Report EC Biotech, 2006; Panel 
Report Japan–Apples, 2003; Appellate Body Report EC–Asbestos, 2001; Panel Report EC Asbestos, 
2000; Panel Report Japan–Agricultural, 1998; Appellate Body Report US—Shrimp 1, 1998; Panel Report 
Australia–Salmon, 1998; Appellate Body Report EC-Hormones, 1998; see also Cho, 2009, 680 (noting 
panel’s reliance on experts in EC–Hormones decision); Harrison, 2007, 413-14 (discussing panel’s use of 
individual experts in EC–Biotech decision); Winickoff et al., 2005, 111 (“In prior cases under the SPS 
Agreement, the panels sought advice from experts in relevant sciences and risk-assessment fields to 
help guide their decisions.”). 
102 Eliason, 2009, 382-84 (describing questions and answers of experts in EC–Biotech). 
103 Panel Report US–Shrimp, 1998. 
104 The expert group was created pursuant to Article 13.2 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, which authorizes panels to seek information from any 
relevant source, including by requesting an advisory report in writing from an expert review group. All 
five members were marine biologists and three of them (Scott Eckert and Jack Frazier from the United 
States and Hock Chark Lieu of Malaysia) were members of the Marine Turtle Specialist Network of the 
IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature). 
105 Shaffer, 2005, 130, 152; see also Knox, 2004, 45 & n.185. 
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The use of such expertise in decision-making can be controversial. On the one 
hand, WTO panels can better check the reasoning of the regulating Member against 
expert opinion to assess whether its regulatory rationales pass muster. Yet, as 
shown in debates over risk regulation between rationalists (such as Cass Sunstein) 
and culturalists (such as Dan Kahan), expertise-based accountability mechanisms 
(focused on effectiveness) are in tension with those of democratic politics (focused 
on responsiveness).106 In the context of multi-level governance, internal 
accountability mechanisms within national democracies are in tension with the 
external accountability mechanisms of WTO technocratic review through partial 
delegation of fact-finding to experts.107 
WTO law broadly, and adjudication in particular, maintains a complex relationship 
with neo-classical economics. Some of the concepts used in WTO law, such as 
“market,” “like products,” “subsidization,” “injury,” and “price suppression,” have 
cognates in economics. However, these cognates may, at times, be false if the 
economic concept is not what was intended by the treaty language. Applying these 
terms thus raises delicate issues of interpretation. To the extent that it is accepted 
that the intent was to ascribe the meaning to a particular term as used in 
economics, and economists are requested to provide their analyses in this light, this 
choice again involves a partial delegation of decision-making to technical experts. 
Parties to WTO disputes increasingly turn to economists for support in making the 
factual case for a WTO violation, and WTO panels increasingly cite the economists’ 
views in support of their decisions. For example, in cases assessing the existence of 
tax discrimination between competitive products, parties have supplied econometric 
data regarding the cross-elasticity of demand of such products, which panels have 
cited in support of their findings.108 Similarly, in the United States–Cotton case, the 
Appellate Body was required to review, among other matters, a finding by the Panel 
that U.S. cotton subsidies had caused “significant price suppression.”109 The 
interpretation and application of the requirement that the U.S. subsidy “cause” 
“significant price suppression” required reliance on at least some economic analysis, 
as well as legal analysis. The question of whether “significant price suppression” 
exists is partially one of legal interpretation to determine the applicable measure 
that is challenged, as well as the meaning of the treaty provision, and partially one 
of assessment of facts regarding suppression of world prices, for which economic 
data is needed. The question of causation also requires both a legal standard of 
causation and the use of economic theory and methodology in the factual analysis. 
The panel did not engage in its own economic analysis in this case, nor did it state 
that it fully relied on economic analyses performed by the complainant’s experts, 
yet it did cite their economic evidence in support of its findings.110 
                                                 
106 Compare Sunstein, 2005, with Kahan et al., 2006, 1073 (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR 
(2005)) (noting “the complexity of reconciling rational risk regulation with democratic decisionmaking”). 
See also Fisher, 2006, 26-34 (contrasting what she terms “rational-instrumental” and “deliberative-
constitutive” administrative approaches to risk regulation). 
107 Cf. Keohane, 2003, 103, 149 (describing how internal democracy does not assure external 
accountability). Grant and Keohane have categorized accountability mechanisms into seven types, which 
they term hierarchical, legal, market, public reputational, fiscal, supervisory, and peer. See Grant and 
Keohane, 2005, 35-36.  
108 See, e.g., Panel Report Chile–Alcoholic Beverages, 1999, ¶ 7.71; Panel Report Korea–Alcoholic 
Beverages, 1998, ¶ 10.43; Panel Report Japan–Alcoholic Beverages, 1996, ¶ 6.32. 
109 Appellate Body Report US–Cotton, 2005; see also André Sapir & Joel P. Trachtman, Subsidization, 
Price Suppression and Expertise: Causation and Precision in Upland Cotton, 7 WORLD TRADE REV. 183 
(2008). 
110 Panel Report US–Cotton, 2004. ¶¶ 7.1207–1209 (“[W]e observe that the simulations were prepared 
by experts, and explained to the Panel by experts. The outcomes of the simulations are consistent with 
the general proposition that subsidies bestowed by Member governments have the potential to distort 
production and trade and the elimination of subsidies would tend to reduce ‘artificial’ incentives for 
production in the subsidizing Member. This is one of the underlying rationales for the establishment of 
the subsidy disciplines in the SCM Agreement. . . . [W]e have taken the analyses in question into 
account where relevant to our analysis of the existence and nature of the subsidies in question, and their 
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Just as the hard sciences provide tools to determine whether there is a scientific 
basis for a sanitary measure, economics provides tools to determine the effects of 
subsidies on prices. Thus, where the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement) calls for a determination by a panel of whether a 
subsidy has caused significant price suppression, a panel can use the information 
provided by economists, including expert testimony or reports, just as it has done 
with scientific expertise in disputes involving SPS and environmental issues. 
Panels have sought and obtained economic information from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) regarding balance of payment issues, as specifically 
contemplated in the GATT.111 The panels in Dominican Republic–Cigarettes and 
India–Quantitative Restrictions, for instance, used such information. In each case, 
the panels used the respective IMF position to support their decisions against the 
respondents.112 
Panels have not (formally) consulted individual experts on economic issues, in 
contrast to their consultation of scientific experts on environmental and food safety 
issues. Economists are, however, part of the WTO secretariat and can assist panels 
informally (which in turn can raise concerns about the transparency of the judicial 
decision-making process). The determination of evidence invoking economic 
concepts, such as the causation of significant price suppression by competitive 
products, would seem amenable to a report from an expert review group comprised 
of economists with expertise in trade economics and econometrics. Article 13 of the 
DSU has been found to provide panels with broad flexibility to utilize experts, so it 
is notable that economic experts have not (formally) been used.113 Article 24 of the 
SCM Agreement calls for the establishment of a “Permanent Group of Experts” to 
perform certain functions under that agreement, such as assisting panels with 
issues relating to prohibited subsidies.114 However, given the limited mandate 
under the SCM Agreement for its permanent group of experts, one alternative is to 
utilize expert review groups under Article 13 of the DSU. Instead of choosing this 
option, panels have so far relied on the litigants to bring their own experts (or 
informally, on internal WTO secretariat members who are economists or have 
training in economics), and then determined which parties presented the better 
argument.115 Yet, as Scott Brewer maintains, “A non[-]expert cannot independently 
and directly check complex theoretical propositions that do not have simple 
observational consequences . . . . Whatever checking the non[-]expert can manage 
must rely on indirect devices like demeanor, credentials, and reputation.”116 
                                                                                                                                              
Economists have sometimes assessed how WTO texts incorporate economic 
concepts that are congruent with economic welfare analysis.117 Where such 
congruence exists, greater precision in the application of these concepts would 
improve economic welfare. The use of experts also could be viewed as enhancing 
overall political welfare if the economic concepts are consistently applied without 
favoring some Members over others. It can be argued that where the treaty 
framers expressed rights and obligations in terms of economic concepts, they 
 
effects, under the relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement, and have attributed to them the 
evidentiary weight we deemed appropriate.”). 
111  GATT, 1994, art. XV (“In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon to consider 
or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange 
arrangements, they shall consult fully with the International Monetary Fund.”). 
112 Panel Report Dominican Republic–Cigarettes, 2004, ¶ 7.138; Panel Report, India–Agricultural, Textile 
and Industrial, 1999, ¶ 5.12.  
113 See, e.g., Bown, 2010, 391, 417–18 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010);  
114 Ehlermann and Ehring, 2003, 1532 & n.63; Pauwelyn, 2003, 331 (“In cases involving complex 
economic matters, panels should, however, overcome their professional pride . . . and appoint economic 
experts.”). Economists do provide ex post analysis of all Appellate Body decisions, jointly authored with 
legal scholars. See Horn and Petros eds., 2007. 
115 See, e.g., Panel Report US–Cotton, 2005..  
116 Brewer, 1998, 1604.  
117 See the analyses prepared in connection with the American Law Institute. 
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implicitly called for an accurate use of those economic concepts. From the 
perspective of participation, since panels may take into account expert opinion 
either expressly or less transparently, the creation of expert review groups could 
increase the transparency of this process. 
Yet, expertise is no guarantee against bias or ideology, and affected stakeholders 
will be concerned, in particular, if questions raising value judgments (such as 
economic development policy) are being delegated to unaccountable economic 
experts who help to justify in technocratic terms judicial decisions with political 
implications. There are, in short, important limits to the usefulness of expert 
methods. In particular, when diverse values must be balanced, economics cannot 
assist in the commensuration among them. Panels may use experts to justify their 
decisions from a technical perspective, but such deference to technical judgment 
will not necessarily avoid legitimacy challenges where particular social priorities are 
at stake. Stakeholders will raise questions about the participation characteristics or 
the legitimacy of assigning even partial decision-making to expert groups of 
economists and scientists. Experts’ assessments of the underlying facts can 
nonetheless assist panels in making the ultimate institutional choices at stake, such 
as whether to defer to a national measure, engage in judicial balancing, turn to 
process-based review, or issue a clear bright-line rule against categories of 
measures, thus leaving ultimate outcomes to market processes. 
4.5. The Institutional Choice of Judicial Balancing 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body face particularly difficult institutional choices 
where WTO disputes raise conflicts between diverse values and social priorities. 
This situation is evident in cases involving Article XX of the GATT and its analogue 
for trade in services, Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade and Services 
(GATS). In some cases, the Appellate Body has explicitly interpreted certain of 
these provisions as requiring a balancing approach. In others, it has appeared to 
back off of a full balancing approach by permitting the Member to choose its “level 
of protection” (such as a zero tolerance) and then asking if this level can be 
reached through a less trade-restrictive means of regulation (finding that nothing is 
as effective as an import ban to achieve it). 
The Appellate Body most notably formulated and applied a judicial balancing 
approach in a case involving a requirement of the Republic of Korea that retailers 
make a choice of only selling Korean or foreign beef.118 Korea’s alleged regulatory 
rationale was to ease monitoring of the labeling of the origin of beef sold in Korea 
to ensure compliance with regulations against deceptive marketing practices, as 
there was evidence that Korean retailers were selling lower-priced U.S. beef as 
Korean beef. The Appellate Body responded by applying a judicial balancing test 
involving (at least) three variables in determining whether the Korean measure was 
“necessary” to secure compliance with Korea’s anti-fraud regulations under its 
Unfair Competition Act for purpose of Article XX(d) of the GATT. The Appellate Body 
concluded: 
In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not “indispensable”, may 
nevertheless be “necessary” within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in 
every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which 
prominently include the contribution made by the compliance measure to the 
enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common 
interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying 
impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.119 
                                                 
118 Appellate Body Report Korea–Beef, 2000. See also Panel Report Dominican Republic–Cigarettes, 
2004, ¶ 7.0 (affirming the “weighing and balancing” by the judicial body of these factors). 
119 See Appellate Body Report Korea–Beef, 2000 ¶ 164 (emphasis added). 
Gregory Shaffer, Joel Trachtman  Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO 
 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 27 
It explicated each of these three listed variables with respect to the question of 
whether a Member’s regulatory measure is “necessary” for purposes of GATT Article 
XX, maintaining: 
− “The more vital or important those common interests or values are, the 
easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ a measure designed as an 
enforcement instrument”;P120 
                                                
− “The greater the contribution [to the realization of the end pursued], the 
more easily a measure might be considered to be ‘necessary”;121 and 
− “A measure with a relatively slight impact upon imported products might 
more easily be considered as ‘necessary’ than a measure with intense or 
broader restrictive effects.”122 
After reiterating that Members have the right to determine for themselves the level 
of enforcement of their domestic laws, the Appellate Body “assume[d] that in effect 
Korea intended to reduce considerably the number of cases of fraud,” and not 
“totally eliminate[] fraud with respect to the origin of beef,” as it had contended.123 
It then found that Korea’s measure was not necessary because a less trade-
restrictive alternative was reasonably available to achieve this aim, such as 
“devot[ing] more resources to its enforcement efforts . . . .”124 
Yet, the Appellate Body did not fully articulate how to conduct the balancing test, 
and, in particular, did not prescribe explicit cost-benefit analysis from a law-and-
economics perspective. It appears that the balancing test prescribed is to proceed 
by a kind of gestalt, rather than by aggregating the value of costs and benefits. It 
was also unclear in Korea–Beef how this balancing test related to the traditional 
test, which asks whether an alternative measure that is less restrictive of trade is 
reasonably available to meet the Member’s policy goal. 
In other cases, the Appellate Body, while consistently referring to the Korea–Beef 
balancing test, has avoided engaging in explicit judicial balancing by applying the 
least trade-restrictive alternative test after finding that the purpose of the 
regulatory measure was to reduce a given risk as much as possible. For example, in 
EC–Asbestos, the Appellate Body found that the level of protection chosen by 
France was “a ‘halt’ to the spread of asbestos-related health risks.”125 The less 
trade-restrictive alternative proposed by Canada of “controlled use” of asbestos 
would not contribute to the realization of this goal to the same extent as would a 
“prohibition.”126 In United States–Gambling, the Appellate Body confirmed that a 
“‘reasonably available’ alternative measure must be a measure that would preserve 
for the responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection with 
respect to the objective pursued.”127 Likewise, in Brazil–Tyres, the Appellate Body 
upheld the panel’s finding that “Brazil’s chosen level of protection is the reduction 
of the risks of waste tyre accumulation to the maximum extent possible,” and found 
that other measures could not contribute to the achievement of this objective in an 
equivalent manner.128 
It is not clear how the Appellate Body will reconcile the right of a Member to 
determine its chosen level of protection with the criterion in a balancing test of 
 
120 Id. ¶ 162. 
121 Id. ¶ 163. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. ¶ 178. 
124 Id. ¶ 180.  
125 Panel Report EC Asbestos, 2000, ¶ 168. 
126 Id. ¶¶ 174–75. 
127. Appellate Body Report US–Gambling, 2005, ¶ 308. 
128 Appellate Body Report Brazil–Tyres, 2007, ¶¶ 144, 156. See also Bown & and Trachtman, 2009, 124.  
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evaluating the importance of the value protected.129 The Appellate Body attempted 
to do so partially in the EC–Asbestos case, where it referred to its decision in 
Korea–Beef.130 There, the Appellate Body pointed out that the protection of human 
life from the risk of asbestos “is both vital and important in the highest degree,” 
suggesting that, per the Korea–Beef balancing criteria, the more important the 
common interests or values pursued, the easier it would be to accept the national 
measure as necessary.131 Moreover, the Appellate Body noted that, in determining 
whether another alternative method is reasonably available, it is appropriate to 
consider the extent to which the alternative measure “contributes to the realization 
of the end pursued.”132 This language suggests that there may be some cases in 
which it is appropriate to restrict the degree to which a state may expect to achieve 
its appropriate level of protection. If so, it arguably represents a significant 
departure from the conventional understanding of “reasonably available,” which 
would consider the costs of the alternative regulation, but not the degree of its 
contribution to the end pursued. 
In this line of cases, the Appellate Body can be viewed as arrogating to itself a 
great deal of authority to balance substantive concerns implicated by a trade 
restriction. In the cases that hold a Member’s policy goals inviolate, in contrast, it 
can be viewed as deferring to a greater extent to the importing Member’s policy 
goals and measures to achieve them. From an economic welfare perspective, 
insights from a full cost-benefit analysis may improve economic efficiency, leading 
to increased economic welfare. However, there are important arguments for a 
retreat from cost-benefit analysis and even from an imprecise balancing test, based 
on the difficulty of commensuration between diverse values and concerns, as well 
as on the expertise of WTO tribunals for such a task.133 To the extent that the 
legitimacy of the WTO Appellate Body would be challenged were it to engage in 
explicit balancing in such cases, this approach is not desirable from the perspective 
of the political welfare of the overall WTO system, and thus of the political welfare 
of the officials of individual Members. 
From the perspective of participation, open-ended judicial balancing tests privilege 
the judicial process compared to determinations made by a political process. In 
contrast to either deference to national decision-making or to a bright line rule as 
applied in the GATT United States–Tuna case discussed next, judicial balancing 
creates greater uncertainty. This approach can thus be viewed as favoring those 
states that are best able to engage in full-scale litigation on a case-by-case basis. 
Large and wealthy states who are repeat players in WTO litigation are able to 
mobilize legal resources more cost-effectively than smaller and poorer ones. The 
dynamics of full-scale litigation can thus favor large and wealthy states and, 
indirectly, the constituents that they represent in these disputes. 
Yet, in creating uncertainty, the Appellate Body may also open space for 
multilateral political negotiations in other fora, fostering the political institutional 
alternative discussed above. Through an in-depth examination of rival policy claims 
and their impacts, the Appellate Body and panel can help frame subsequent 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations between disputing parties. In other words, 
institutional choices should not be viewed as static, because institutional processes 
can dynamically interact. 
                                                 
129 See Marceau and Trachtman, 2002. Cf.. Regan, 2007 (arguing that the Appellate Body decided EC–
Asbestos, United States–Gambling, and Dominican Republic–Cigarettes on the principle that Members 
get to choose their own level of protection).  
130 Panel Report EC Asbestos, 2000, ¶ 172.  
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Trachtman, 1998. 
Gregory Shaffer, Joel Trachtman  Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO 
 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 29 
4.6. Delegation to Markets  
In a number of contexts, the meaning of critical WTO legal terms can be 
determined in light of market practice. In other cases, judicial interpreters can 
apply interpretive choices that directly allocate decisions to market processes. For 
example, in evaluating national measures under GATT Articles I, III, and XI, 
together with the exceptions of Article XX, we have seen how panels and the 
Appellate Body often review them in relation to alternative measures that are less 
restrictive of trade. Import bans can be particularly scrutinized because of the 
frequent availability of more market-friendly means to inform consumers of foreign 
environmental and other social impacts, such as product labeling. Product labeling, 
in particular, can inform consumption decisions (and, indirectly, foreign production 
decisions) in a less draconian manner. Taking such a labeling approach effectively 
shifts decision-making over the appropriate balance among trade, environmental, 
development, and other social goals from a national political process to the market. 
The GATT United States–Tuna case took this route, accepting environmental 
labeling regimes as not in violation of the Article I MFN obligation of GATT.134 
WTO judicial decision-makers can apply interpretive choices that delegate decision-
making away from national political processes to markets. Arguably, the most 
famous example of this situation is WTO panels’ handling of domestic regulatory 
measures based on production and process methods (PPMs) in the absence of 
multilaterally-agreed rules. The (in)famous United States–Tuna case and the initial 
WTO panel in the United States–Shrimp case took both involved U.S. regulatory 
restrictions based on fishing methods, a type of PPM.135 These cases addressed 
U.S. regulatory bans on the import of products from countries that did not have a 
marine species conservation program comparable in effectiveness to the relevant 
U.S. regulatory program. Neither panel deferred to the U.S. national regulation that 
restricted the marketing of foreign products in the United States on account of the 
alleged lack of adequate regulation of the PPMs abroad.136 The panel in United 
States–Tuna stated: 
[I]f the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the United States were 
accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health 
protection policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate without 
jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement. The General Agreement 
would then no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among all 
contracting parties but would provide legal security only in respect of trade between 
a limited number of contracting parties with identical internal regulations.137 
Similarly, the initial WTO panel in United States–Shrimp found that, although the 
U.S. regulation was not discriminatory on its face, by “conditioning access to the 
U.S. market” on a change in a foreign government’s environmental regulatory 
policy, the U.S. measure “threatens the multilateral trading system.”138 The panel’s 
broad ruling was based on the type of measure affecting trade, a PPM, and not on 
the measure’s social purpose or the details of its implementation. The two panel 
decisions effectively maintained that PPM-based measures that did not affect 
products (as such) were in violation of GATT rules, so that foreign products using 
different PPMs could not be restricted. As a result, these products would effectively 
be in competition with each other, and consumers would decide between them 
based on advertising and (potentially) labeling regimes regarding the PPM. 
                                                 
134  Report of the Panel US Tuna, 1991, ¶ § 5.44. 
135 Panel Report US–Shrimp, 1998, ¶¶ 7.24-.26 (describing U.S. justification for restrictions); Panel 
Report US–Tuna, 1991, ¶ 5.24 (describing U.S. justification for restrictions). 
136 Panel Report US–Shrimp, 1998, ¶ 8.1; Panel Report US—Tuna , 1991, ¶ 5.34 (finding U.S. 
restrictions unjustified). 
137 Id. § 5.27. 
138 Panel Report US–Shrimp, 1998, ¶¶ 7.48, 7.51; see id. ¶¶ 7.44, 7.45, 7.51, 7.55, 7.60, 7.61 
(repeating the assertion of a threat to the system nine times); see also Shaffer, 2005, 130–60. 
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This type of market-based model has many benefits from the perspective of 
participation in the decision-making process. A market-based decision-making 
mechanism can permit more individualized participation in determining the proper 
balance between trade, environmental, and other social goals. In this manner, 
markets can enhance democratic voice. Marketers can label their products in terms 
of social preferences. Consumers, informed through advertising campaigns, can 
choose which products to buy on the basis of how they are produced, such as 
“dolphin-safe” tuna or “GMO-free” foods. In choosing between products, consumers 
implicitly choose among alternative regulatory regimes for the production of 
particular products. Such a WTO approach could stimulate not only product 
competition, but also regulatory competition.139 Different regulatory approaches 
would be in competition when consumers select which product to buy. In 
purchasing a product, one would effectively be voting for one regulatory system 
over another.  
From a welfare perspective, such an interpretive approach to the handling of 
regulatory measures based on PPMs in the absence of multilateral agreements can 
foster greater commercial certainty, thereby facilitating cross-border trade, 
promoting development, and protecting a liberal international trading system. The 
market decision-making mechanism, however, is also subject to bias, resulting in 
skewed participation in the determination of the appropriate balance of the policy 
concerns. Markets are subject to information asymmetries, externalities, and 
collective action problems. Information costs would be high. The labels could be 
misleading, and even if the labels were accurate, many consumers would not take 
the time to review them. Some consumers, even if informed, might decide to buy 
the cheaper product and “free ride” on more socially-concerned purchasers. Other 
purchasers might refrain from buying a product that is produced in a particular way 
because they doubt that their purchasing decisions would be effective in light of 
other consumers’ actions. The views of consumers who do not plan on consuming a 
particular product (however it is produced) would not be represented in the market 
process. Social activists thus fear that competition between socially-protective 
regulations and non-socially protective regulations would result in a “race to the 
bottom” toward less protective regulations.140 
Other types of cases in which market or consumer preferences are critical are those 
that refer to market competition for a determination of the “likeness” of 
products.141 The reference to competition as the determinant of “likeness” leaves 
little room for considering the types of regulatory distinctions that might not be 
made by the market. Indeed, the economic theory of regulation suggests that 
regulation would often be necessary precisely where the market fails to make 
important distinctions.142 In these cases, reference to markets might suffer from 
deficiencies in welfare and political efficiency. While consumer preferences are 
incorporated in market decision-making, regulatory preferences might be seriously 
underweighted, diminishing political participation as well. 
4.7. Vertical (Re-)Allocation: Deference to States 
One interpretive choice that some commentators favor is for the WTO judicial body 
to show deference to a country implementing a trade restriction on social policy 
grounds in reflection of local values, thereby effectively allocating decision-making 
authority to a national political process. Some scholars contend that WTO rules 
should be interpreted in deference to the “societal values” of the country imposing 
                                                 
139 See Bratton, McCahery, Picciotto and Scott eds., 1996; Esty and Geradin eds., 2000. 
140 See, e.g., Wiener, 2007, 1965 (noting likelihood of “race to the bottom” in climate change 
regulation). 
141 See Panel Report EC Asbestos, 2000; Appellate Body Report Japan–Alcoholic Beverages, 1996. 
142 See Beales, Craswell and Salop, 1981. 
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the trade restriction.143 Environmental activists and many legal scholars further 
maintain that WTO rules (and, in particular, GATT Articles III.4 and XX) should be 
interpreted to permit trade restrictions imposed on account of foreign production 
processes that are environmentally harmful, so long as the same ban is applied 
domestically.144 For example, a WTO panel could hold that so long as a national 
regulatory purpose is facially valid, then the panel will look no further at the 
regulatory measure chosen, whether in terms of its impact on trade, its 
effectiveness, its proportionality, or otherwise. This choice was implicitly made by 
the Appellate Body in Brazil–Tyres.145 
The issue of deference is intricately linked to the standard of review applied by 
panels. In general, the Appellate Body’s approach to standards of review has 
eschewed special deference to states. Rather, in the EC–Hormones decision, the 
Appellate Body explained that the appropriate standard of review is that expressed 
in Article 11 of the DSU: an objective assessment of the facts.146 Even where the 
drafters of the WTO treaty seem to have intended an especially deferential standard 
of review, under Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Appellate 
Body has not so far accorded extensive deference, as noted earlier. Nonetheless, in 
some cases, such as United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–
Hormones dispute, the Appellate Body has appeared to scold panels for being too 
intrusive in their review.147 As the Appellate Body stated in that case, concerning an 
SPS measure, “the review power of a panel is not to determine whether the risk 
assessment undertaken by a WTO Member is correct, but rather to determine 
whether that risk assessment is supported by coherent reasoning and respectable 
scientific evidence and is, in this sense, objectively justifiable.”148 
The institutional choice of deference would entail particular institutional 
consequences in terms of social and political welfare, and the participation of 
affected stakeholders. Strong policy grounds sometimes exist for deferring to 
domestic regulatory choices given the remoteness of international institutional 
processes. Participation in democratic decision-making at the national level is of a 
higher quality than at the international level because of the closer relation between 
the citizen and the state, the consequent reduced costs of organization and 
participation, and the existence of a sense of a common identity and of communal 
cohesiveness — that is, of a demos. National and sub-national processes are better 
able to tailor regulatory measures to the demands and needs of local social and 
environmental contexts. They are also more likely to respond rapidly and flexibly to 
new developments. This approach applies a principle espoused in a variety of 
disciplines, from law to political science to institutional economics.149 
                                                 
143 Nichols, 1996. 
144 Bodansky, 2000; Howse and Regan 2000. 
145  Appellate Body Report Brazil–Tyres, 2007. 
146  Appellate Body Report EC-Hormones, 1998, ¶¶ 115–17. 
147  Appellate Body Report US–Continued Suspension, 2008. 
148 Id., ¶ 590; see also Appellate Body Report US–Semiconductor, 2005, ¶¶ 182–90. In the United 
States–DRAMS case, the Appellate Body maintained, “[W]e are of the view that the ‘objective 
assessment’ to be made by a panel reviewing an investigating authority’s subsidy determination will be 
informed by an examination of whether the agency provided a reasoned and adequate explanation as to: 
(i) how the evidence on the record supported its factual findings; and (ii) how those factual findings 
supported the overall subsidy determination.” Id. ¶ 186. It concluded that “the Panel failed to apply the 
proper standard of review and, therefore, failed to comply with its obligations under Article 11 of the 
DSU,” because “the Panel went beyond its role as the reviewer of the investigating authority’s decision 
and, instead, conducted its own assessment, relying on its own judgment, of much of the evidence 
before the USDOC.” Id. ¶ 190. 
149 See, e.g., Tullock, 1969 (discussing the effectiveness of small-sized governmental units based on a 
number of factors, including the internalization of externalities); Williamson, 1967 (arguing that large 
organizations encounter the problem of “control loss” and that this loss may be a reason to reduce the 
scale of large organizations). 
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Yet, national and sub-national political decision-making processes can be highly 
problematic from the perspectives of participation, accountability, and global social 
and political welfare. First, producer interests may be better represented than 
consumer interests on account of their higher per capita stakes in regulatory 
outcomes, which can give rise to economic protectionist legislation, reducing 
national as well as global social welfare.150 Second, even where national and local 
procedures are relatively pluralistic — involving broad participation before 
administrative and political processes that are subjected to judicial review — they 
often do not take account of adverse impacts on foreigners. International law 
comes into play precisely where other states have concerns about how these 
domestic political choices affect them. If the WTO judicial process showed complete 
deference to national political processes, permitting them to ignore significant 
effects on foreign interests in a manner contrary to the obligations set forth in the 
WTO treaty, then accountability would suffer in a reciprocal sense: The affected 
foreign states’ political processes, and the political process of international law, 
would be prevented from inducing states to take into account the foreign effects of 
their actions. 
Members with large markets, such as the United States and European Union, are 
often favored by such a deferential approach, which is why developing countries 
tend to be wary of deference on social policy grounds.151 This institutional choice 
can permit countries with large markets to use their market leverage to compel 
foreign regulatory change aligned with the large country’s particular preferences. 
Were the Appellate Body to defer to national legislation and its administrative 
application, then it would effectively allocate decision-making over the appropriate 
balance of the trade and other regulatory concerns at stake to national political and 
administrative processes. 
4.8. Process-Based Review 
As a result, instead of simply deferring to a Member’s policy goals or engaging in 
judicial balancing of substantive concerns, the Appellate Body has sometimes 
reviewed national decision-making processes to attempt to ensure that they take 
into account the views of affected foreign parties. Since the creation of the GATT in 
1949, Article X has provided for certain transparency requirements for the 
administration of trade regulations.152 While this article was considered to be 
“subsidiary” to the substantive provisions of the GATT prior to the WTO, it has been 
increasingly enforced by WTO panels and the Appellate Body in recent years, as 
have its more detailed analogues in the GATS, TRIPS, SPS, and TBT 
153agreements.  
The WTO Appellate Body has applied this process-based approach in a number of 
cases involving defenses based on social concerns. For example, in the United 
States–Shrimp case, the Appellate Body returned the substantive issue to a lower 
vertical level of decision-making — that is, back to the U.S. Department of State, 
which was responsible for implementing the U.S. legislation — subject to certain 
procedural conditions.154 By reviewing the due process and transparency of the 
State Department’s implementing procedures, the Appellate Body attempted to 
                                                 
150 See OLSON, JR., 1965. 
151 See Shaffer, 2007. 
152 Ala’i, 2008, 779 (“The oldest transparency and good governance obligation of the WTO is Article X of 
[the] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)”); Steger, 2008, 710 (noting that art. X of the 
GATT, requiring transparency, has existed since 1947). 
153 See Stewart and Sanchez, 2011 (citing Argentina–Hides and Leather; Dominican Republic–Import 
and Sale of Cigarettes; United States–Customs Bond Directive; EC–Selected Customs Matters; Japan–
Agricultural Products II; Argentina–Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties; Guatemala–Cement II). 
154 See Shaffer, 2005. 
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enhance the representation of affected foreign parties and thereby counter the 
national biases of domestic legislative and administrative bodies.155 
In this case, the Appellate Body faulted the United States for the national biases in 
its procedures, and effectively required the United States to create an 
administrative procedure pursuant to which foreign governments or traders have an 
opportunity to comment on U.S. regulatory decisions that affect them. The 
Appellate Body held that the application of the U.S. measure was “arbitrary” in that 
the certification process was not “transparent” or “predictable,” and did not provide 
any “formal opportunity for an applicant country to be heard, or to respond to any 
arguments that may be made against it.”156 The Appellate Body admonished the 
United States for failing to take “into consideration different conditions which may 
occur in the territories of . . . other Members,” and recommended that the Dispute 
Settlement Body request that the United States ensure that its policies were 
appropriate for the local “conditions prevailing” within the complainant developing 
countries.157 
Similarly, in the EC–Preferences case, the European Community’s lack of procedural 
transparency was the primary ground for the Appellate Body’s finding against the 
EC’s scheme.158 The EC granted special tariff preferences to a list of twelve 
countries on the grounds that they undertook effective programs to combat illicit 
drug production and trafficking (the Drug Arrangements). In this case, however, 
the country beneficiaries were simply designated up front by the EC, subject to no 
defined review criteria. The Appellate Body faulted the EC’s Drug Arrangements for 
a series of procedural reasons, including (1) because they “provide[d] no 
mechanism under which additional beneficiaries may be added to the list of 
beneficiaries”; (2) because they did not “set out any clear prerequisites — or 
‘objective criteria’ — that if met, would allow for other developing countries ‘that 
are similarly affected by the drug problem’ to be included as beneficiaries”; and (3) 
because they did not give any “indication as to how the beneficiaries . . . were 
chosen or what kind of considerations would or could be used to determine the 
effect of the ‘drug problem’ on a particular country.”159 
In cases involving Members’ use of trade remedies against dumping and subsidies, 
panels and the Appellate Body likewise have sought refuge in procedural criticisms 
of national economic analyses, rather than engaging with the substantive 
determinations.160 Panels, for example, have examined whether national 
authorities have created a record evidencing that they considered the required 
factors.161 Were panels to use the institutional alternative of expert review groups, 
discussed above, they might feel more comfortable engaging in a full substantive 
review, but instead they often have turned to this process-based form of review. 
Process-based review may seem desirable, because it is relatively less intrusive 
than substantive review and focuses directly on the issue of participation of 
domestic and foreign parties. However, process-based review also raises serious 
concerns, in particular, because processes can be manipulated to give the 
appearance of consideration of affected foreigners without in any way modifying a 
predetermined outcome. Even if international case-by-case review were possible 
(which it is not), it would be difficult, if not impossible, for an international body to 
determine the extent to which a national agency actually takes account of foreign 
                                                 
155 Id. 
156 Appellate Body Report US—Shrimp 1, 1998, ¶¶ 180, 186. 
157 Id. ¶¶ 164–65, 177, 186–88. 
158 See Shaffer and Yvonne, 2005, 977. 
159 Appellate Body Report EC –Developing Countries, 2004, ¶¶ 182–89.. 
160 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report US–Steel, 2003. 
161 See, e.g., Panel Report Egypt–Steel, 2002, ¶ 7.34; Appellate Body Report Thailand–Iron, 2001; 
Appellate Body Report EC Cotton, 2001; Panel Report EC–Cotton, 2000; Panel Report, Mexico–Corn 
Syrup, 2000. 
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interests. The challenge remains that Members, particularly powerful ones, can thus 
go through the formal steps of due process without meaningfully considering the 
views of other affected parties. As a result, WTO panels and the Appellate Body 
may retain the interpretive alternatives of judicial balancing and the application of 
bright line rules. 
5. Conclusion 
This Article has provided a new framework for understanding and evaluating the 
treaty drafting and interpretive choices confronting WTO Members and judicial 
bodies, as part of dynamic processes of institutional interaction over time regarding 
the meaning and application of WTO texts. When Members define rules and 
standards, and WTO panels and the Appellate Body interpret them, they make 
institutional choices that structure and facilitate social decision-making. These 
choices are fruitfully evaluated in terms of which social decision-making process 
decides a policy issue, affecting the participation of stakeholders. This form of 
institutional analysis provides a proxy that helps us to evaluate the comparative 
distributive and efficiency consequences of treaty drafting and interpretive choices, 
both in social welfare and public choice terms, because institutional processes 
mediate the articulation of individual preferences. 
The analytic framework of this Article permits us to assess the consequences of 
alternative treaty drafting and interpretive choices in comparative institutional 
choice terms. We have shown how these choices allocate authority among different 
social decision-making processes, which, in turn, interact over time. We have 
evaluated the consequences of these allocations both in participatory terms and in 
terms of the efficiency and distribution of economic and political welfare. First, 
these choices affect the degree of transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of 
social decision-making. Second, by deciding among such institutional alternatives 
as incorporation of international standards, judicial balancing, delegation to 
markets, national deference, and process-based review, these choices help 
determine which social decision-making process decides a particular policy issue in 
particular cases, thereby affecting the institutional mediation of individual 
preferences. Our framework affords a better understanding of how WTO panels and 
the Appellate Body, in practice, have made alternative institutional choices. It also 
helps us to more effectively evaluate the comparative welfare and participatory 
implications at stake in these choices. Although we apply this framework to WTO 
treaty drafting and judicial interpretation, the framework can be usefully applied in 
describing and evaluating choices inherent in the creation and interpretation of any 
domestic or international legal text. 
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